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INTRODUCTION

T

HIS article is written to propose a change in the law of involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill. The impetus for such
a change is found in the present commitment system, which is outmoded and unresponsive to the needs of the mentally ill in contemporary
society. To set the stage for the proposed change, an examination of
the development of institutions for the mentally ill and the concomitant development of involuntary civil commitment is necessary. Furthermore, the development and effects of the deinstitutionalization
movement must be scrutinized.
I.

THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONS

In 1842 Charles Dickens traveled through much of America. 1
During his travels, he visited several types of institutions, including
hospitals for the mentally ill. In Boston, he described in glowing
terms a "State Hospital for the insane, admirably conducted on...
enlightened principles of conciliation and kindness."' 2 Dickens'
description of the physical plant could easily be applied to many state
operated facilities in existence today:
Each ward in this institution is shaped like a long gallery or hall, with the dormatories of the patients opening
from it on either hand. Here they work, read, play at skit1. See 1 E. JOHNSON, CHARLES DICKENS: His TRAGEDY AND TRIUMPH 357446 (1952).
2. C. DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES AND PICTURES FROM ITALY 45 (London

1970) (first published in London, 1842) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN NOTES].
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ties, and other games; and when the weather does not admit
3
of their taking exercise out of doors, pass the day together.
On a later visit to another "Lunatic Asylum," Dickens offered a
much less optimistic assessment:
I cannot say that I derived much comfort from the inspection of this charity. The different wards might have
been cleaner and better ordered; I saw nothing of that salutary system which had impressed me so favorably elsewhere;
and everything had a lounging, listless, madhouse air, which
was very painful. The moping idiot, cowering down with
long dishevelled hair; the gibbering maniac, with his hideous laugh and pointed finger; the vacant eye, the fierce wild
face, the gloomy picking of the hands and lips, and munching of the nails: there they were all without disguise, in naked ugliness and horror. In the dining-room, a bare, dull,
dreary place, with nothing for the eye to rest on but the
empty walls, a woman was locked up alone. She was bent,
they told me, on committing suicide. If anything could
have strengthened her in her resolution, it would certainly
have been the insupportable monotony of such an
4
existence.
These few lines from Dickens' pen indicate that the use of large
institutions for the confinement of the mentally ill was commonplace
by the middle of the nineteenth century. Already present were many
of the institutional abuses challenged in the courts more than a century later. 5
Prior to American independence, the mentally ill did not fare
well. 6 The dangerous or violent were frequently incarcerated with
criminals, 7 while the non-dangerous were treated like common pau3. Id
4. Id. at 93.
5. For a discussion of these challenges in the courts, see notes 151-205 and ac-

companying text infra.
6. See A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 39-54 (1949); COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1-75 (H. Kaplan, A. Freedman & B. Sadock
eds. 3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY]. See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 1-14 (S. Brakel &
R. Rock eds. 1971). This treatise contains a useful description of legal treatment

accorded the mentally ill from prehistoric times through the twentieth century.
7. See genera/I; L. BELL, TREATING THE MENTALLY ILL FROM COLONIAL TIMES
TO THE PRESENT (1980).
Deutsch states that
[u]ntil the last quarter-century of the colonial period there were no
hospitals in all the land to which the mentally ill might be sent. Generally
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pers. 8 Responsibility for poor relief fell to local authorities, 9 who followed the lines set down by the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601.10 The
Act's guiding spirit was repression, rather than relief, of pauperism."I
By the second quarter of the eighteenth century, the dependent mentally ill were often found languishing in workhouses and almshouses.' 2 These early institutions were anything but therapeutic, and
the lot of the mentally ill was certainly not pleasant. 13 Many were
left to wander aimlessly about the countryside. In fact, early town
records reveal that local authorities not infrequently escorted such in-

4
dividuals to the edge of town and instructed them not to return.'
Some officials, who were still more resourceful, physically removed
hapless individuals from one town and, under cover of darkness,

they were not considered as a special class, but were disposed of as criminals
or as paupers, as the case might be. They were ordinarily confined in jails,
workhouses, poorhouses, or in private pens, cages and strongrooms. The
object of public provision was frankly repressive or custodial; no thought
was given to therapy.
A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 420.
8. The American Bar Foundation has opined that the non-dangerous mentally
ill were
treated as a monolithic mass; there was no attempt to analyze its compo-

nents. A "drifter" was a "drifter" and nothing more. Whether he was mentally or physically disabled or simply lazy made no difference to the
townspeople, who feared they would have to support him. For these reasons the mentally disabled, during the colonial period, were often subjected
to the same treatment as the itinerant poor. In the strongly Puritanical
atmosphere of the time, which equated work and industry with the moral
life, it was inevitable that the laws should be aimed at compelling a man to
labor, rather than at providing for his needs. In the case of the mentally
disabled, these measures led to such grotesque incidents as whipping the
hapless. The victims of society wandered aimlessly about the countryside,
undergoing ridicule from village children and idlers and eking out an existence by begging.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 4.
Another author describes the living conditions of the mentally ill in colonial
America as follows:
In colonial America the mentally ill were found (to say they were cared for
or treated would be misleading) in a number of settings. 1. Their own or
relatives' homes. 2. Physicians' homes 3. Jails. 4. Workhouses. 5. Almshouses or poorhouses. 6. Wandering freely about. 7. Areas near their
homes, where they had been "dumped."
J. TALBO'r, THE DEATH OF THE ASYLUM 14 (1978). See also, MADHOUSES, MADDOCTORS, AND MADMEN 166-92 (A. Scull ed. 1981) (describing the treatment accorded the indigent mentally ill in England).
9. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 44.
10. An Act for the Relief of the Poor, 1601, 2 Eliz. 702, Ch. 2.
11. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 44.
12. Id at 50-51.
13. For a moving description of life in an English workhouse, see C. DICKENS,
OLIVER TwiST, at chs. I-III.
14. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 123-25.
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"relocated" them in another community.' 5
In 1751, Benjamin Franklin played a major role in establishing
the first general hospital built in America to receive and care for the
mentally ill.' 6 Located in Pennsylvania, this institution pioneered attempts to treat the mentally ill. The first "asylum" dedicated exclusively to treatment of the mentally ill was established in Virginia in
1773.'1 Throughout the colonial period, however, the majority of the
mentally ill continued to be treated as paupers. 18
During the first half of the nineteenth century, a "general trend
toward institutionalization, a natural outgrowth of the increase and
centralization of population, manifested itself."' 19 Conditions within
the institutions varied in accordance with the thinking of the individual in charge. Some particularly enlightened and humane superintendents followed the teachings of Phillippe Pinel,2 0 Benjamin
Rush, 2 1 and William Tuke.2 2 These early leaders in what eventually
15. Id at 45.
16. Id at 58-59. A book written by the American Bar Foundation states that
the establishment of hospitals to which the mentally disabled could be sent
for treatment developed in the eighteenth century. In response to a petition
drawn by Benjamin Franklin, the Pennsylvania Assembly, in May 1751,
authorized the establishment of the first general hospital, to receive and
cure the mentally ill as well as the sick poor.
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 5.
17. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 5.
18. See id The Virginia asylum established in 1773 was the only public hospital
devoted exclusively to the treatment of the mentally ill until the Eastern Lunatic
Asylum was established in Lexington, Kentucky in 1824. Id
19. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 114-15. During the 1830's, the public began to
believe that mental illness was curable. While the belief was premised largely on
unfounded reports, it had the effect of adding support to the movement in the direction of institutions for the treatment of mental illness. Id at 132.
20. See TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 6, at 5 7-59. As superintendent of
the Bic&tre and Salptitre institutions for the insane in France, Pinel is remembered
for freeing the inmates from their chains. Id
21. See id.at 60-64. Benjamin Rush, called the "father of American Psychiatry," was a leader during this time in placing the observation and treatment of the
mentally ill on a scientific footing. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 7.
22. See TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 6, at 55-5 7. Tuke was the leader
of the moral treatment movement in England. Id His work influenced the Quakers
of New England, who established one of the most progressive and enlightened institutions of the time. In a letter dated July 17, 1815 from Tuke to Thomas Eddy, who
was a leader of the movement in New York, Tuke stressed the importance of treatment in an environment structured to be as "normal" as possible: "The employment
of insane persons should, as far as is practicable, be adapted to their previous habits,
inclinations, and capacities." Id
For a description of the treatment of the mentally ill at the facility established
under the leadership of Thomas Eddy in New York, see S. TUKE, DESCRIPTION OF
THE RETREAT (1964). See also MADHOUSES, MAD-DOCTORS, AND MADMEN, supra
note 8.
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became the discipline of psychiatry23 founded the moral treatment
movement. 24 Proceeding upon principles of respect for human dignity and individuality, as well as upon the belief that mental illness
was curable, these men and their followers treated their patients in as
normal and pleasant an environment as possible. By calling on their
patients to act responsibly, and encouraging them in their efforts to
do so, these early psychiatrists witnessed an improvement in their pa25
tients' conditions and a lessening of aberrant and violent behavior.
Unfortunately, however, most of the mentally ill did not come under
the care of such progressive practitioners. 26 As Professor Albert
Deutsch stated:
It is a melancholy fact that the great majority of the
mentally ill who were public dependents remained unaffected by the great psychiatric reforms of the time. As far as
they were concerned time stood still. They were subjected
to substantially the same methods of care and treatment ex27
isting in the late colonial period.
23. The forerunner of the American Psychiatric Association was founded in
Philadelphia in 1844 by thirteen hospital superintendents. See AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 7. For a discussion of the origins of the discipline of
psychiatry and the early movement toward institutionalization, see TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY, supra note 6, at 72-73.
24. See A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 88-113. The moral treatment movement
called for "humane treatment, kindness, open wards, pleasant surroundings, no or
minimal restraints, structured activity, and, above all, a familiar, if not parental,
relationship between superintendent and patients, which included joint dining, walks
in the countryside, etc." J. TALBOTr, supra note 8, at 16. See also TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY, supra note 6, at 60-64; MADHOUSES, MAD-DoCTORS, AND MADMEN,
supra note 8, at 105-15.
25. A. DEUTSCH,supra note 6, at 88-113. Most large mental hospitals were built
away from urban centers. Few people realize that, at least in some cases, this was
done for therapeutic and humanitarian reasons. It was felt that the quiet and peace
of the countryside would have a salubrious effect upon the patients. See id. at 93.
Furthermore, institutions in urban areas often drew crowds of curious sightseers, hoping for some "entertainment" at the expense of the mentally ill. This problem was
remedied by locating facilities away from crowded communities.
26. See i. at 116. During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, specialized
institutions for the treatment of the mentally ill were established in nine states. Id. at
114. There were not enough beds to care for everyone, and while the institutions
were nominally open to all, the poor were frequently discouraged from entering
them. Id at 115-16.
Local authorities developed four principal methods for dealing with the poor
mentally ill: (1) appropriating funds to support the mentally ill in the homes of
family members; (2) sending the ill to almshouses where they were mixed with other
paupers; (3) contracting with a local individual to care for all of the mentally ill at a
fixed per capita price; and (4) auctioning off the mentally ill to the bidder with the
best offer. Id The auction method was practiced for as long as 50 years after the
American Revolution in some rural areas. Id at 117-20.
27. Id

at 116.
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Much of the credit for the rise of institutions during the midnineteenth century rightfully goes to a former school teacher with a

deep-seated social conscience and an inexhaustible reservoir of energy. When Dorothea Lynde Dix was exposed to the plight of the
mentally ill, she undertook a campaign on their behalf which resulted
in the erection of more than thirty institutions for the care and treat-

ment of the mentally ill.28 Miss Dix's movement was timely and progressive, and she unquestionably improved the lives of many
individuals. "But in social processes, what originates as a progressive
idea may become rigid, inflexible and anachronistic with the passing
of time."'29 Such was the fate of large mental hospitals.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, as more and

larger institutions were erected, 30 the forms of institutional neglect so
poignantly described by Dickens became the rule rather than the ex-

ception. 31 The mentally ill were locked away, often for life, in settings
sometimes reminiscent of Dante's Inferno.32 This situation carried
28. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 8. For discussions of Miss
Dix's crusade, see A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 158-86; J. TALBOTT, supra note 8, at
17-18. In testimony before a state legislature, Miss Dix made an interesting statement: "No fact is better established in all hospital annals than this: that it is cheaper
to take charge of the insane in a curative institution than to support them elsewhere
for life." A. DEUTSCH,supra note 6, at 172. Many present day advocates of deinstitutionalization would take issue with Miss Dix on this economic point. The argument
is often made that institutional care is far more expensive, financially and socially,
than treatment outside institutional walls.
29. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 187. Describing the rise of institutions for the
mentally ill, Professor Deutsch states:
The ideal of institutionalization . . .was peculiarly a product of the
nineteenth century. It owed its rise mainly to the industrial revolution,
with concomitant changes in the social order, rapidly evolving complexities
in social relationships, tremendous expansion of population, and closer
grouping of that population in large towns and cities. . . . This was all
very well in so far as the building of institutions represented a radical improvement over the former anarchy and indifference and neglect.
Id at 186-87.
30. During the second half of the nineteenth century, services for the mentally
ill gradually became centralized in state agencies. Until that time, they were primarily the responsibility of local governments. For a description of the nineteenth-century trend toward the establishment of institutions, see TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY,
supra note 6, at 72-74.
31. See AMERICAN NOTES, supra note 2, at 93. For a detailed description of
institutional conditions during the second half of the nineteenth century, see A.
DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES 40-96 (1948).
32. See J. Perceval,,ALunatic's Protest, in THE AGE OF MADNESS 29-42 (T. Szasz,
ed. 1973). Mr. Perceval was an English gentleman. When he was twenty-seven, he
suffered a psychotic episode, and was placed in an asylum by his family. After his
recovery and release, he published two books describing the treatment he received in
the asylum. His observations, though written more than a century ago, remain
poignant and timely:
Now with regard to my treatment, I have to make at first two general
observations, which apply, I am afraid, too extensively to every system of
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over well into the twentieth century. It was in part the appalling
conditions found in many state-operated institutions which gave rise
to the deinstitutionalization movement during the 1950's and
1960's. 3

In his 1963 State of the Union message, President Kennedy

acknowledged the beginnings of the movement to deinstitutionalize
when he said: "I believe that the abandonment of the mentally ill
and the mentally retarded to the grim mercy of custodial institutions
too often inflicts on them and on their families a needless cruelty
management yet employed towards persons in my condition. First, the suspicion and the fact of my being incapable of reasoning correctly, or deranged in understanding, justified apparently every person who came near
me, in dealing with me. . .in a manner contrary to reason and contrary to
nature. . . . Secondly, my being likely to attack the rights of others gave
these individuals license, in every respect, to trample upon mine. My being
incapable of feeling, and of defending myself, was construed into a reason
for giving full play to this license. . . . Instead of great scrupulousness being observed in depriving me of any liberty or privilege, and of the exercise
of so much choice and judgment as might be conceded to me with safety;on the just ground, that for the safety of society my most valuable rights
were already taken away, on every occasion, in every dispute, in every argument, the assumed premise immediately acted upon was, that I was to
yield, my desires were to be set aside, my few remaining privileges to be
infringed upon, for the convenience of others. Yet I was in a state of mind
not likely to acknowledge even the justice of my confinement, and in a state
of defencelessness calculated to make me suspicious, and jealous of any further invasion of my natural and social rights: but this was a matter that
never entered into their consideration.
Against this system of downright oppression, enforced with sycophantish adulation and affected pity by the doctor, adopted blindly by the credulity of relations, and submitted to by the patients with meek stupidity, or
vainly resisted by natural but hopeless violence, I had to fight my way for
two years, wringing from my friends a gradual but tardy assent to the most
urgent expostulations: not from the physicians; their law is the same for all
qualities and dispositions, and their maxim to clutch and hold fast. . . . I
was never asked, Do you want any thing? do you wish for, prefer any thing?
have you any objection to this or to that? I was fastened down in bed; a
meagre diet was ordered for me; this and medicine forced down my throat,
or in the contrary direction; my will, my wishes, my repugnances, my habits, my delicacy, my inclinations, my necessities, were not once consulted, I
may say, thought of. I did not find the respect paid usually even to a
child . ..
J. Perceval, supra, at 31-33.
33. See J. TALBOTT,supra note 8, at 21. Although the deinstitutionalization
movement was strongest during the 1950's and 1960's, some advocated deinstitutionalization early in the twentieth century. For example, Clifford Beers, who was not a
mental health professional, became interested in mental health issues after he was
hospitalized. In 1909, Mr. Beers founded the National Committee for Mental Hygiene. Id. He stressed the importance of prevention, community organization in
support of the mentally ill, and child guidance. Id. In the words of Professor Talbott, Beers "was to have probably the most profound effect of all on the delivery of
mental health services in twentieth century America." Id. Mr. Beers' views on
mental health issues can be found in C. BEERS, A MIND THAT FOUND ITSELF (1908).
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which this Nation should not endure."'3 4 While thousands of individuals continue to reside in institutions, significant progress has been
made to improve institutional conditions and decrease the number of
individuals for whom institutional care is necessary.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT LAW

A.

HistoricalDevelopment

The development of involuntary commitment statutes in
America followed a steady course from little or no legislation to the
present-day scheme of complex and carefully designed statutes which
attempt to balance the liberty interests of those for whom commit35
ment is sought against the legitimate interests of the state.
In colonial times, there were no statutes governing commitment
of the mentally ill.36 Persons who were "furiously insane" could be
detained as necessary in order to prevent harm.3 7 For the most part,
the mentally ill were left to their own devices or were confined in
workhouses, almshouses, or prisons. For those seeking release from
confinement, the procedure was to file a writ of habeas corpus.38 However, it must have been a rare occasion when legal proceedings were
instituted by, or on behalf of, those considered to be "insane."
With the proliferation of large institutions during the nineteenth
39
century, states began to enact involuntary commitment statutes.
34. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1963, at 14 (1964).
35. See generally, R. ROCK, M. JOCOBSON & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION
AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1968); J. Bucknill, Notes on Asylums for the
Insane in America, repritedin MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOCIAL POLICY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 23-24 (G. Grob ed. 1973).
36. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 419.
37. Id at 419-20. Professor Deutsch states that
the common law which the colonies inherited from the mother country upheld the right to deprive insane persons of their liberty. Anyone could arrest a "furiously insane" person, or one deemed "dangerous to be permitted
to be at large," and confine him for the duration of his dangerous condition,
provided that this were done in a humane manner. It was permitted to
"confine, bind and beat" him if his condition rendered it "necessary." Insane persons recognized as such (namely, the violent and the dangerous)
were dealt with by the police powers.
Id.
38. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra, note 6, at 6-7.
39. An early commitment statute was enacted by the New York legislature in
1788. It provided that persons found to be "furiously mad" could be "locked up" in
some secure place. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 420. In 1797 Massachusetts enacted
a statute entitled "An Act for Suppressing Rogues, Vagabonds, Common Beggars
and other idle, disorderly and lewd Persons," which was invoked to "commit" mentally ill persons. Id
Professor Deutsch offers these observations regarding the early development of
commitment laws:
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This development was given great impetus by the efforts of Mrs.
E.P.W. Packard, 40 who herself had been committed to an institution
by her husband. 4 1 Upon her release, she began a campaign for
stricter legislation. In 1865, Mrs. Packard lobbied in Illinois for passage of a commitment bill which read as follows: "No person shall be
imprisoned. . . and treated as an insane person except for irregularities of conduct, such as indicate that the individual is so lost to reason
as to render him an unaccountable moral agent. ' 42 While her bill
did not become law, she was successful in obtaining the enactment in
Illinois and Iowa of so-called "personal liberty" bills which required
43
trial by jury before an individual could be involuntarily committed.
According to Professor Deutsch, legislative efforts to regulate inWhen the early hospitals and asylums for the mentally ill sprang up,
commitment could be effected with the greatest of ease. No specific legislative safeguard existed for the protection of the personal liberty of the supposedly mentally ill person. No special laws concerning commitment
procedure were enacted in America until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. The pauper and indigent insane might be summarily committed to the poorhouse, prison or hospital by friends or relatives or by
order of public officials (such as superintendents or overseers of the poor),
police authorities, or courts.
With the increase of state hospitals during the 1830's and 1840's the
serious consequences of the total lack of legislation defining commitment
procedures became more and more manifest.
A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 420-22. For a detailed history of the development of
commitment laws, see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 6-8.
40. See generally A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 424-27; AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 7-8; E.P.W. PACKARD, MODERN PERSECUTION OR INSANE
ASYLUMS UNVEILED, reprntedtn MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOCIAL POLICY: THE AMERI-

CAN EXPERIENCE (G.Grob ed. 1973).
41. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 424. Mrs. Packard was committed under an
1851 Illinois statute that was remarkable for its sexism:
Marnd women and infants who, in the judgment of the medical superintendents of the state asylum at Jacksonville are evidently insane or distracted, may be entered or detained in the hospital at the request of the
husband of the woman or the guardian of the infant, without the evidence of
insanity required in other cases.
1851 Ill.
Laws § 10 (emphasis in original).
42. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 425 (emphasis deleted). Mrs. Packard had
presented another bill for consideration by the Illinois legislative committee. This
bill read as follows: "No person shall be regarded or treated as an insane person or a
monomaniac simply for the expression of opinions, no matter how absurd these opinions may appear." Id
43. Id. at 425-26. The Illinois "personal liberty" statute provided as follows:
[N]o superintendent, medical director, agent, or other person, having the
management, supervision or control of the insane hospital at Jacksonville,
or of any hospital or asylum for insane and distracted persons in this state,
shall receive, detain or keep in custody at such asylum or hospital, any person who has not been declared insane or distracted by a verdict of a jury
and the order of a court, as provided by an act of the general assembly of
this state, approved February 16, 1865.
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voluntary commitment grew significantly during the 1870's as a pub44
lic response to the continued expansion of large institutions.
Through the efforts of Mrs. Packard and others, the public became
increasingly aware of the tremendous loss of liberty and dignity asso45
ciated with commitment.
With the growth of institutions, popular distrust of mental hospitals increased. In 1874, for example, Nathan Allen quoted a hospital
trustee as follows: " 'It seems as if the public believed that every man
connected in any way with a hospital for the insane had entered into
a conspiracy to deprive the patients of all their rights and to do violence to all the relations of life.' "46 Legislators responded to rising
public concern by continuing to enact and refine statutes designed to
regulate involuntary commitment and protect against unwarranted
loss of liberty. 47 Although by present standards these statutes would
be considered unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, 48 they constituted a valuable first step in the evolution of commitment standards
designed to balance legitimate state interests against individual
liberty.
From the beginning of the twentieth century through the 1950's,
civil commitment law remained fairly static. 49 Although there was
significant variation from state to state, many statutes afforded relatively little in the way of procedural protections. 50 Others permitted
1867 Ill. Laws 1.
This compulsory jury trial law was repealed in 1893. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6,
at 427 n. *.
44. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 427.
45. For a discussion of the popular effects of Mrs. Packard's legislative efforts,
see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 34-35.
46. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 427.
47. For examples of these early statutes, see notes 41-43 and accompanying text
supra.

48. See A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 418-28.
49. The American Bar Foundation has stated that "[tihe ... legislation enacted during the latter part of the nineteenth century constitutes the basic legislative
pattern currently in force." AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 8. There
was relatively little litigation concerning involuntary civil commitment during the
first half of this century. The explosion of case law in the area had to await the
general awakening of social conscience witnessed during the civil rights movement of
the 1960's. For a discussion of civil commitment laws in force during the first half of
this century, see W. BROMBERG, PSYCHIATRY BETWEEN THE WARS, 1918-1945
(1982). See also, T. GUTHEIL & P. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 40 (1982).
50. It has been estimated that as late as 1909, 18% of the persons admitted to
New York state hospitals for mental illness in the preceding year had been detained
in jails pending their commitment. A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 435. In 1933, 14
states permitted persons alleged to be insane to be detained in jails pending commitment. Id. An Alabama statute provided that "[a]ny insane person who is at large
and not under the control or restraint or management of any person may be taken
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indeterminate commitment on the basis of vague standards such as
whether the individual was a "social menace" or "a fit and proper
candidate for institutionalization." The combined effects of lenient
commitment standards and a predisposition of many psychiatrists of
the time in favor of institutionalization 5' contributed to the overpopulation of state hospitals. Thousands, and, over time millions, of
individuals were forced into large and often inhumane institutions
which were little more than human warehouses.
Courts began to address substantive and procedural aspects of
involuntary commitment on a significant scale during the 1960's.
One of the most important decisions, Lessard v. Schmidt,52 was decided

in 1972 by a federal district court sitting in Wisconsin. In this
landmark case, the court articulated standards for procedural due
process 53 which have been widely followed by courts 54 and legislainto custody or arrested by any officer or person and carried immediately to the
probate judge of the county.
...15 ALA. CODE § 432 (1958). This statute was
declared unconstitutional as violating the due process rights of insane persons in
1974. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
51. For a discussion of the perceived tendency of psychiatrists to overcommit,
see Cohn, Standardsfor Civil Commitment and the Right to Liberty, in 1 PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 191-92 (1979); Morse,

A Preferencefor Liberty. The Case Against Involuntay Commitment of the Mentally Disordered,
70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 74-78 (1982).
52. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957
(1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976).
53. These standards include the following: (1) Notice of a hearing given sufficiently in advance to afford a reasonable opportunity to prepare; (2) A requirement
that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt all facts necessary to show
that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous; (3) The application of the privilege
against self-incrimination to statements made to a psychiatrist. 349 F. Supp. at 10901101.
54. Courts have held that there is a constitutional right to notice of the proceedings. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378passim (M.D. Ala. 1974); New York
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973);
Lessardv. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1091. The Supreme Court has written that a right
to counsel extends to proceedings where a state proposes to transfer a prison inmate
to a mental hospital. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980). See also Herford
v. Parker, 396 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1968); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. at 389; Lessardv.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1097. A right to cross examine witnesses has also been found
to exist. See, e.g., Lynch v. Barley, 386 F. Supp. at 394. The right to remain silent is
applicable to involuntary commitment proceedings. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F.
Supp. 1106, 1111-12 (D. Hawaii 1977),af'dinpart,rev'dinpart, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.
1980); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. at 394. Rules of evidence are also applicable in
such hearings. See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 517 (D. Neb. 1975);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. at 394; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1103. The
state carries the burden of proof at involuntary commitment proceedings. See, e.g.,
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, order on remand, 588 S.W.2d 569 (1979); Lessardv.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1095. Courts have found a right to trial by jury in commitment proceedings. See, e.g., Lessardo. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1099-1100; Quesnell v.
State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 240-42, 517 P.2d 568, 578-79 (1973). The proceedings must
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tures 55 throughout the country. Other courts fine-tuned the substantive commitment standards employed by the states to ensure that
vague and overbroad provisions were eliminated. 56
Mental health professionals applauded many of the changes in
57
the substantive and procedural aspects of involuntary commitment.
Legal commentators are nearly unanimous in their support of stricter
involuntary commitment laws. 58 There is growing concern, however,
that the pendulum may have swung too far. Some argue that it has
become so extraordinarily difficult to treat the ill-but-unwilling that
many are going without essential therapy and support services. 59 As
one commentator observed, patients are "rotting with their rights
on." 60 Mental health experts are beginning to mount the argument
that existing commitment laws are anti-therapeutic, and in many
cases, harmful. The narrowness and rigidity of present commitment
be recorded. See, e.g., In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Lynch v.
Baxle, 386 F. Supp. at 396; State ex. rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 445, 202
S.E.2d 109, 127 (1974); Quesnelv. State, 517 P.2d at 578 n. 21. Courts have held that
those adjudicated mentally ill are entitled to periodic review of their commitment.
See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 617 (1979); State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390
A.2d 574 (1978); Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 479-80, 378 A.2d 553, 556 (1977).
55. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-541 to 549 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 647-36 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.030 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.01-.07
(1957).
56. See, e.g., Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah
1979) (Utah statute permitting commitment of mentally ill who can make rational
decisions regarding treatment and who are not a threat to themselves is unconstitutional on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness); Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640
(M.D. Pa. 1976) (Pennsylvania statute permitting commitment of persons "in need of
care" due to mental disability unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness).
57. See, e.g., Roth, A Commitment Law for Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers, 136 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1121, 1122 (1979). Dr. Roth acknowledges the fact that physicians and
attorneys often have conflicting views concerning the issue of involuntary commitment, and proposes a commitment scheme designed to satisfy both preferences. See
id
58. Hundreds of articles have been published in the legal literature on involuntary commitment. Most have favored enactment of stricter procedures in commitment proceedings. See generally, DuBose, Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and
Drug Treatment ofSchizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the PatientJusti) Involuntagy Treatment.,
60 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1976); Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional
Requirementfor Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 562
(1977). For a thorough discussion of involuntary commitment laws, see LaFond, An
Examnation of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 499
(1981).
59. See, Slovenko, CriminalJusttceProceduresin Civil Commitment, 28 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 817 (1977) (criticizing the use of procedures designed for the
adjudication of criminal matters in the context of civil commitment).
60. Applebaum & Gutheil, Rotting With Their Rights On: ConstitutionalTheo9v and
Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 306 (1979). While the article deals with the right to refuse
treatment, its title echoes the battle cry being raised against strict commitment
criteria.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29: p. 367

standards make it impossible for the mental health delivery system to
work effectively for the seriously disabled.
B.

The Authority of the State to Impose InvoluntaO, Commitment.- The
Parens Patriae Power

The power of the state to involuntarily commit the mentally ill is
derived from two sources: the police power and the parens patriae
power. The police power vests in the states "a plenary power to make
laws and regulations for the protection of the public health, safety,
welfare, and morals." 6 1 Under this authority, the state may involuntarily commit mentally ill persons who constitute a danger to others
62
or themselves.
The second, and for present purposes more important, source of
63
authority for involuntary commitment is the parens patriae power.

Under itsparenspatrt'aeauthority, the state may care for those who are
a danger to themselves or are unable to care for themselves. 64 Because the involuntary treatment scheme proposed in this article is
based on this source of state authority, it is important to examine its
origins and development.
The doctrine ofparenspatriae originated in Roman law, and was
incorporated into English law. 65 Blackstone described some of the
61. Developments in the Lat-Cwi'l Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190, 1222 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. For a discussion of the
constitutional basis of the police power, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
24-25 (1905).
62. The requirement of dangerousness has been an element of involuntary commitment law throughout its history. See,e.g., Lessardv. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1084-

86; In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845). For a discussion of Lessard, see notes
52-54 and accompanying text supra.
Critics of involuntary commitment argue that mental health professionals cannot predict dangerousness, and that when called on to do so, they regularly err on the
side of overcommitment. For examples of this criticism, see Cocozza & Steadman,
The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness.- Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Morse, supra note 51, at 62-63, 74-78.

63. For a discussion of theparenspatriaepower in the area of mental health law,
see generally Lafond, supra note 58, at 504-09, 516-25; Developments, supra note 61, at

1207-22.
64. For a discussion of cases affirming the use of the parens patriae power in the
involuntary commitment context, see notes 91-107 and accompanying text infra.
65. For a general discussion of the development of the doctrine ofparenspatriae
in the area of the commitment of the mentally ill, see Developments, supra note 61, at
1207-12. See also N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY (1971). Kittrie states as follows:
The role of the sovereign asparenspatriae was rather limited in the common-law tradition. Social institutions for the care of the ill and disabled
were either within the ecclesiastical dominion or the responsibility of the
local feudal lord. Continuing the Roman legal tradition, however, the English sovereign also assumed the functions of protecting certain incompetent
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similarities between the civil law and the common law in these words:
"In th[e] case of idiots and lunatics, the civil law agrees with ours, by
assigning them tutors to protect their persons, and curators to manage
66
their estates."
In early feudal times, the lord of the fief "was entitled to the
wardship of the lands and persons of those of unsound mind. '6 7 Unfortunately, this power was frequently abused by avaricious individuals interested more in profit than their responsibility to provide for
the disabled.6 8 Between 1255 and 1290, "[t]he crown acquired this
wardship, to the exclusion of the lord, probably by virtue of some
statute or ordinance. '69 The statute referred to is probably "the socalled statute de Praerogativa Regis."' 70 Soon after the Crown acsubjects. Suggestions of the sovereign's role asparenspatriaeare evident in
[an] eleventh-century enactment . . . [which] decreed:

"If an attempt is

made to deprive any wise man in orders or a stranger of either his goods or
his life, the king shall act as his kinsman and protector . . .unless he has
some other." Another early manifestation of theparenspatriaerole in English law was the recognition by Edward II in the fourteenth century of the
sovereign's responsibility towards the property and later the person of the
insane.
In medieval England the mentally disordered were first the responsibility of the church and the lord of the manor. When a national law of guardianship developed, its emphasis was proprietary, to protect the fuedal
succession and the heirs against the dissipation of assets. The original
guardianships dealt with children and the mentally defective only, but by
the middle of the fourteenth century they were extended to the mentally ill
and were made a duty of the Crown. From this modest beginning, followed
by the slow process of welfare functions shifting from the feudal lords, the
medieval guilds, and the church to the state in the seventeenth, eighteenth,
and nineteenth centuries, the parens patriae state of present day came into
full bloom.
N. KITTRIE, supra at 9 (footnotes omitted).
66. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *305. While Blackstone draws upon
the similarities between English and Roman law, he also points out the differences.
In arguing the superiority of the English system, he stated:
But, in another instance, the Roman law goes much beyond the English.
For, if a man, by notorious prodigality, was in danger of wasting his estate,
he was looked upon as non compos, and committed to the care of curators or
tutors by the praetor. And, by the laws of Solon, such prodigals were
branded with perpetual infamy. But with us, when a man on an inquest of
idiocy hath been returned an unthrif, and not an idiot, no further proceedings have been had. And the propriety of the practice itself seems to be very
questionable. It was doubtless an excellent method of benefiting the individual, and of preserving estates in families; but it hardly seems calculated
for the genius of a free nation, who claim and exercise the liberty of using
their own property as they please ...
Id.at *305-06.
67. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 473 (1922).
68. See W. BLACKSTONE,supra note 66, at *303.
69. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 67, at 473.
70. Id The "statute" came into being sometime between 1255 and 1290. Professor Holdsworth points out that its origins are uncertain: "Throughout the Middle
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quired authority over the person and property of the mentally disabled, the power was delegated to the courts of Chancery. 7
72
While never completely divorced from humanitarian purposes,
the doctrine of parens patriae under English law was principally concerned with setting forth rules for management of the wealth and
property of the disabled. 73 Indeed, Blackstone's discussion of "the
custody of idiots [and] . . .lunatics" is found in the portion of his

74
Commentaries concerned with "the King's ordinary revenue."
Over time, the distinction between the "idiot" and the "lunatic"
took on legal significance. 75 According to Blackstone, "An idiot, or
natural fool, is one that hath had no understanding from his nativity;
and therefore is by law presumed never likely to attain any."' 76 If an
individual was found to be an idiot, 77 the Crown was responsible for
providing him with necessaries. 78 Concurrent with this duty, the
Crown was entitled to retain the profits produced by the idiot's property during his lifetime. 79 The law developed differently for persons

Ages it was accepted as a genuine statute; it may have been merely private work, or
have emanated from some official on the instructions of the King." Id.at 473 n.8.
For the provisions of the statute, see PEROGATIVA REGIS, 1329, 17 Edw. 2, ch. 9-10.
71. See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 67, at 474-75; I. W. LEWIS, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS BY SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

KNIGHT 270 n.61 (1897).
72. For a discussion of the humanitarian goals of the parens patriae power, see
notes 84-87 and accompanying text infra.
73. Critics of the parens paitae justification for involuntary commitment often
point out that the doctrine had its origins in legal rules concerned with issues of
wealth. One court has stated that "[e]arly reported English law primarily adjudicated disputes among men of property, and the early development ofparenspatriae
was more a state fiscal policy than a humanitarian doctrine." State ax re. Hawks v.
Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 427, 202 S.E.2d 109, 118 (1974). Despite its focus on wealth,
the doctrine was intended from its inception as a means of ensuring that the interests
of individuals would be protected. Indeed, during a time when personal well-being
was closely tied to ownership and profit from real property, it is not surprising that
the principal legal device for the protection of personal security would be based on
the protection of wealth and property.
74. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *302.
75. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 481 (2d
ed. 1968).
76. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *302. If it were possible to evaluate individuals categorized as "idiots" by means of modern intelligence tests, many would be
diagnosed as mentally retarded. See generaly R. SCHEERENBERGER, A HISTORY OF
MENTAL RETARDATION (1983).

77. At early common law the writ de idiota inquirendo was used to determine
whether an individual was an idiot. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *303. For an
American case discussing the writ, see In re Barker, 2 Johns. Ch. 232 (N.Y. 1816). For
a discussion of In re Barker, see notes 94-99 and accompanying text infra.
78. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *303. An idiot was entitled during his
lifetime to be supported by the Crown from the profits of his lands. F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 75, at 481.
79. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *303. Following the death of an idiot,
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found to be lunatics. Blackstone states that
[a] lunatic or non compos menli, is one who hath had understanding, but by disease, grief, or other accident, hath
lost the use of his reason. A lunatic is indeed properly one
that hath lucid intervals, sometimes enjoying his senses, and
sometimes not, and that frequently depending upon the
change of the moon.8 0
During periods of incapacitation, it was the King's responsibility to
"provide for the custody and sustentation of lunatics, and preserve
their lands and the profits of them for their use, when they come to
their right mind.""' During periods of lucidity, however, lunatics
82
were entitled to manage their own affairs.
While legal rules differed for the idiot and the lunatic, the personal treatment accorded the intellectually disabled hinged on the
compassion and understanding of the individuals charged with their
welfare. For the wealthy mentally ill and retarded, life was sometimes pleasant; for the impecunious, however, existence must have
been very difficult.
Early English law was grounded in large measure on the law of
property, and was geared to the goal of economic stability. Theparens
patriae authority was designed in part to enrich the Royal treasury
and protect the heirs of wealthy "idiots" and "lunatics" from disinheritance.8 3 In defense ofparenspatriae,however, it must be emphasized that the doctrine did not ignore the welfare of the incapacitated
individual. 84 The Crown was plainly charged with a duty to provide
for the well-being of those under its protection. "In acting as parens
patriae, the King or his representative was required to promote the
interests and welfare of his wards and was not empowered to sacrifice
the King was required to "render the estate to the heirs; in order to prevent such
idiots from alienating their lands, and their heirs from being disinherited." Id; see
also F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 75, at 481.
80. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *304. This passage from the Commentaries
evidences the primitive understanding of mental illness prevalent during Blackstone's
day. It was the prevailing wisdom that the phases of the moon were responsible for
periods of lucidity or lunacy.
81. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *304. See W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note

67, at 261-63; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 75, at 481.
82. See F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 75, at 481.
83. See note 73 supra.
84. See F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 75, at 481 ("The King is to
provide that the lunatic and his family are properly maintained out of the income of
his estate"). See also W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 67, at 476 ("The underlying prin-

ciple of these rules is the interest of the lunatic").
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the ward's welfare to the welfare of others. '8 5 As Blackstone noted,
the Crown became "the general and supreme guardian of all infants,
as well as idiots, and lunatics .... "86 Clearly discernable in the English development ofparens patriae authority is a sense of a societal responsibility to care for those incapable of caring for themselves.
The fact that the doctrine was as much concerned with issues of
wealth as with care and protection of the mentally ill is not reason to
eschew it as tainted. The aspects of the doctrine concerned with sovereign authority and responsibility to provide for those unable to care
for themselves grew and matured into an important source of state
8
authority to improve the lives of seriously disabled people.

7

When the American colonies gained their independence from
England, theparenspatriaepower was vested in the state legislatures.,8
In the 1855 case of Fontan v. Ravenel, 9 the Supreme Court stated that
the "[s]tate, as a sovereign, is theparenspatrae."90 Review of the early
authorities indicates that as developed in America, the doctrine of
parenspatriae was directed as much to the power of the states to provide for individuals unable to protect themselves as to matters of
property and wealth. For example, in 1890 the Supreme Court used
sweeping language to describe the power: "Th[e] prerogative ofparens
85. Developments, supra note 61, at 1208.
86. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *47.
87. See In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 777 (Wash. 1942). In Hudson, the Washington Supreme Court discussed the parenspatriae authority in the context of court ordered medical treatment for minors in the face of parental objection. The court
observed that parens patriae authority was "in former times ... involved chiefly for
children with property .... [T]his ancient chancery doctrine is today turned to
wider service on behalf of infants suffering from poverty, vice and neglect .. " Id.
The development of theparenspatriaepower to act on behalf of children parallels the
growth in authority to protect the seriously mentally ill.
88. Developments,supra note 61, at 1208. "In the United States, the 'royal prerogative' and the 'parens patriae' function of the King passed to the States." Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972). Se Wheeler v. Smith, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
55, 82-83 (1849). See also 67A C.J.S. Parens Patrtae 159:
The words "parens patriae," meaning "father of his country," were
applied originally to the king. Since, on this country's achieving its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved on the people of the
states, the state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.
The doctrine of parens patriae expresses the inherent power and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a
person non sui juris, and under the doctrine the state has the sovereign
power of guardianship over persons of disability, and in the execution of the
doctrine the legislature is possessed of inherent power to provide protection
to persons non sui juris and to make and enforce such rules and regulations
as it deems proper for the management of their property.
Id (footnotes omitted).
89. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1855).
90. Id.at 384. In Fonlain, the Court was speaking of the parenspatrae power
generally; not as specifically applied to the mentally ill.
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patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State. .

.

. [I]t is a

most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the
interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who
cannot protect themselves." 9 1 In 1922, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he doctrine... may be defined as the inherent power
and authority of a Legislature of a state to provide protection of the
person and property of persons non sui juris. .... 92
Pursuant to theparenspatriaeauthority, state legislatures enacted
statutes to protect minors, establish juvenile courts, create guardianships, establish protective services for incapacitated adults, and provide for the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill. 9 3 The

authority is firmly entrenched in the law and tradition of American
government.
Turning to early cases concerned specifically with application of
parenspatriaeauthority to the mentally ill, it is well to begin with the
1816 case In re Barker.94 Mr. Barker was eighty-five years of age when
his children sought a writ de lunatico inquirendo to determine whether
he was of unsound mind and "wholly unfit and unable to manage his
affairs." 95 The Chancellor first considered whether a court of equity
had jurisdiction in such a case. 96 Concluding that it did, the court
91. Morman Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
92. McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1,4, 205 P. 917, 925 (1922). See also Warner Bros.
Pictures v. Brodel, 179 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. Cal. 1947), rev'don other grounds, 31 Cal. 2d
766, 192 P.2d 949 (1948). The California Court of Appeal stated:
The doctrine of parens patriae is the inherent power and authority of the
state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui
juris. . . . The legislature is possessed of inherent power to provide protection of persons non sui juris, and to make and enforce such rules and regulations as it deems proper for the management of their property.
See generally 179 P.2d at 64. LaFond, supra note 58, at 504-06. See also Horstman,
Protective Servzces for the Elderly.- The Limits of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215, 221

(1975) ("the individual's well-being is the sole justification for the exercise of the
state's authority as parens patr'ae").

93. See Developments, supra note 61, at 1208-09; Horstman, supra note 92, at 21721.
94. 2 Johns. Ch. 232 (N.Y. 1816).
95. Id
96. Id at 233-34. Mr. Barker evidently suffered from an infirmity of the aging
process, perhaps senility. Under the early common law, an individual with this sort
of disability was considered neither an idiot nor a lunatic, but rather fell into the
category denominated non compos mentis. Id at 233. Early English cases held that
courts lacked "any jurisdiction over the case of mere weakness of mind." Id. The
Chancellor rejected the early authorities in favor of later decisions upholding the
jurisdiction of the court of equity to adjudicate such matters:
I am satisfied that these later decisions are not only founded in good
sense, and the necessity of the case, but are a sound exposition of the common law which gave to the King, asparenspatriae, the care and custody of
all persons who had lost their intellects, and become non compos, or incompetent to take care of themselves.
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stated that "[t]he court of chancery is the constitutional and appropriate tribunal to take care of those who are incompetent to take care
of themselves. There would be a deplorable failure of justice, without
such a power. The object is protection to the helpless. . . .97
The Chancellor observed the consequences of holding that the
equity court lacked jurisdiction: "A numerous class of persons, whose
minds have sunk under the power of disease, or the weight of age,
would, in that case, be left without protection, and liable to become
the victims of folly, or fraud. This would be a blemish in the jurisprudence of the country." 9
The Barker opinion demonstrates that American courts very
early defined their jurisdiction to encompass matters related to the
protection of the mentally ill. 99 This assumption of responsibility is
further evidenced by the 1845 case In re Oakes 100 in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court employed parens patriae and police
power rationales to order the detention of a mentally ill individual
"[where] restraint [was] necessary to his restoration or [would be] conducive thereto."' 0' Chief Justice Shaw stated that "the right to restrain an insane person of his liberty is found in that great law of
humanity, which makes it necessary to confine those whose going at
0 2
large would be dangerous to themselves or others."'
Later cases affirmed the parenspaiae responsibility of a state to
Id at 237.
97. Id at 234.
98. Id at 237.
99. Though the Barker case was decided in 1816, the issues with which the
Chancellor struggled are still before the courts and are still without definitive resolution. For example, the Barker court acknowledged the great difficulty in ascertaining
whether an individual is legally incapacitated. Judges today address this question on
a regular basis. The Chancellor in Barker stated as follows:
I am aware, however, that the inquiry must, in many cases, be peculiarly
delicate, because it concerns the character of the party, and his natural
rights, and because of the difficulty there is in ascertaining the extent of the
decay of the mind, necessary to form a proper case for the interference of
the court.
2 John. Ch. at 234.
100. In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845).
101. Id at 125. The Oakes case has been thoroughly discussed by several commentators. Professor Deutsch states that the case represents "probably the first time
that the therapeutic justification for restraint was explicitly stated in a decision
handed down by an American court." A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 422. See also
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 6, at 6-7; Horstman, supra note 92, at 22224; Developments, supra note 61, at 1209-10.
102. 8 Law Rep. at 125. The Oakes court combined the police power andparens
patna justifications for involuntary treatment. See Horstman, supra note 92, at 22223.
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provide for the mentally ill.103 In a 1915 case, 10 4 for example, a fed-

eral district court stated that "[a] state would indeed be derelict of its
duty if it failed to make adequate provision for the care and treatment of the insane. The state is the parens patriae of the insane."' 1 5
And, in the oft-cited 1979 case of Co!yar v. Third Judicial District
Court,' 10 6 the district court expressly upheld theparenspatriaeauthority

as a legitimate source of state power to involuntarily commit the mentally ill. 107

The foregoing authorities demonstrate that the parens patriae
power runs as a continuous thread through the fabric of American
law. It has been held since colonial times that the sovereign may, and
in some instances must, intervene in the lives of individuals suffering
mental disability. 10 8 It may be that the ancient doctrine offparenspatrice has been in "full retreat"' 1 9 in recent years, as courts and commentators criticize the abuses of liberty sometimes carried out in its
name. 110 However, it remains true that the beneficent purposes underlying the doctrine are sound. So long as the state's use of parens
patriae authority is carefully circumscribed with substantive and procedural safeguards,' 11 the doctrine serves as the principal vehicle by
103. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Ballay the
court discussed the use of parens patriae authority to compel treatment for a nondangerous individual:
Since the individual poses no danger to society, society's interference must
be justified on the basis of the state's status as parens patriae. It is clearly
recognized that the state may act in this capacity and that relaxed procedures may be justified in certain circumstances, . . . and, indeed, it has

been suggested that a duty to so act may occasionally exist.

Id
104. Hammon v. Hill, 228 F. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915).
105. Id at 1000.
106. 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979).
107. Id at 429 (parens patriae power upheld, but state must afford due process).
In Colyar, the district court quoted from In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
For the pertinent language from In re Ballay, see note 103 supra.
108. In In re Pickle's Petition, a Florida court referred to "the state's duty to protect [the mentally ill] as a class incapable of protecting themselves." In re Pickle's
Petition, 170 So. 2d 603, 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). See R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON
& R. JANOPAUL, supra note 35, at 7 ("[t]he doctrine ofparenspatriae. . . refers to the

state's duty to protect persons under disability").
109. State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 432, 202 S.E.2d 109, 120
(1974).
110. See LaFond, supra note 58, at 516-25.
111. See Colyar v. Third JudicialDist. Court, 469 F. Supp. at 429 ("the humanita-

rian motivation of the state when acting under parens patriae does not shield the use
of the power from due process requirements."); Developments, supra note 61, at 1210
(stressing the need for substantive and procedural due process as requisite to the exercise of the parenspatriae power).
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which the government can care for thousands of mentally ill individuals who are unable to care for themselves.

III.

THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION MOVEMENT

A.

HistoricalDevelopment

The mid-nineteenth century social reform movement sponsored
by Dorothea Dix began as an enlightened and humane attempt to
improve the lot of the mentally ill.112 In days when scientific understanding and treatment were at best primitive, mental hospitals could
at least offer shelter, food, and a degree of safety.
Well into the present century, large state hospitals carried pri-

mary responsibility for care of the mentally ill." 13 The number of
patients in mental hospitals grew to a high of 559,000 in 1955.1'4 For
thousands of chronically mentally ill individuals, state hospitals became lifetime residences." 5 The deplorable conditions found in
many of these institutions are well documented by numerous authors.1 6 Institutions were chronically understaffed," 17 and many staff
members were unqualified to work with, let alone treat, patients. " 8
Prior to the discovery of antipsychotic medications during the 1950's,
violent and uncontrolled behavior was a constant problem, and restraints and seclusion rooms" 9 were rountinely employed in nearly
112. For a discussion of this reform movement, see notes 28-34 and accompanying text supra.
113. Grob, HistoricalOrigins ofDeinstitutionahlzation, in DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
(L. Bachrach ed. 1983).
114. Goldman, Adams & Taube, Deinstitutionalizathon: The Data Demythologtzed,
34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 129, 131 (1983).
115. H. FOLEY, COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION 1 (1975). See
Grob, supra note 113, at 21.
116. A. DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948); K. KESEY, ONE FLEW
OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (1962). Cases describing these conditions include Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1302-11 (E.D. Pa.
1977), ajfd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom. Wyatt v. Aderhoh, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310-12 (5th Cir. 1974).
117. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
118. Id See also Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1305 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc),rev'd, 451 U.S.
1 (1981).
119. Even with the discovery of antipsychotic medications, some abusive physical restraint persisted. In 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed
that "[a]ides frequently put patients in seclusion or under physical restraints, including straightjackets, without physician's orders. One resident had been regularly confined in a straightjacket for more than nine years." Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305, 1310-11 (5th Cir. 1974). See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446
F. Supp 1295, 1306-07 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aftd, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc),

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss2/2

22

Myers: Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Nee
1983-84]

INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT

every institution. 120 Meaningful treatment was largely unavailable,
and hospitalization amounted to little more than custody. 12 1 Many
long-term chronic patients became dependent on their institutional
providers, losing social skills essential for independent living.' 2 2 Facilities not only lacked treatment programs, but were dehumanizing
and dangerous places to live. 123 Physical attacks by residents and
staff were not uncommon, sometimes causing death. 124 In sum, life
inside institutional walls was often "nasty, mean, brutish and
short."1

25

As early as 1920, some academic psychiatrists realized that hospital care was inadequate.126 As a result, psychiatrists in training were
encouraged to avoid state hospitals and develop practices in the community. 127 This was the beginning of the movement toward community mental health care. In 1946, the National Institute of Mental
Health was established, and funds became available to create comrev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (stating that physical restraint remains necessary in some
instances today). See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
120. See A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 213-28; J. TALBOTT, supra note 8, at 26.
121. See S. SEGAL & U. AvIRAM, THE MENTALLY ILL IN COMMUNITY-BASED
SHELTER CARE:

A STUDY OF COMMUNITY CARE AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

18

(1978) [hereinafter cited as SEGAL].
In cases involving some mentally retarded individuals and a relatively small
group of chronic mentally ill patients, commitment is based on custody rather than
treatment. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). It
has been recognized that custody serves an important and legitimate need. Some
individuals cannot live safely outside the protection afforded by custodial care. For
such people, safe and humane protective custody is the least restrictive appropriate
alternative. See R. ROCK, supra note 35, at 5.
122. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 3-73 (1961); H. WILSON, DEINSTITUTIONALIZED
RESIDENTIAL CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISORDERED 106 (1982); Rhoden, The Limits of Libery. Detnsltutzonah:zation, Homelessness, and Liberianan Theory, 31 EMORY L.J.
375, 380-81 (1982). See also D. VAIL, DEHUMANIZATION, AND THE INSTITUTIONAL
CAREER 140-56 (1966).
123. Set Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated andremanded,
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
While a resident at the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, Romeo, who
was profoundly mentally retarded, was injured on over seventy occasions.
These injuries were both self-inflicted and the result of attacks by other
residents, some in retaliation against Romeo's aggressive behavior. The injuries included a broken arm, a fractured finger, injuries to sexual organs,
human bite marks, lacerations, black eyes, and scratches. Moreover, some
of plaintiff's injuries became infected, either from inadequate medical attention or from contact with human excrement that the Pennhurst staff
failed to clean up.
644 F.2d at 155.
124. See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1311 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974).
125. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. 1, ch. 4 (1651).
126. H. FOLEY, supra note 115, at 1.
127. Id
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munity mental health services, 128 thereby reducing reliance on state
institutions. 129 In the 1950's, antipsychotic medications became
available throughout the United States, 130 permitting "for the first
time significant alleviation of psychiatric symptoms without resort to
physical restraints." 1 31 While the antipsychotics were vital to deinstitutionalization, they were not the sole therapeutic advance. Non-me32
dicinal psychiatric treatment was also improving significantly.1
In 1963, Congress passed the Mental Retardation Facilities and
33
Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act (CMHC).1
128. Schoonover & Bassuk, Deinstitutionalization and the Private General Hospital Inpatient Unit.- Implications for Clinical Care, 34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 135
(1983). For an in-depth analysis of the growth of services for the mentally ill since
the end of World War II, see H. FOLEY, supra note 115.
The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is a government-supported
institution. Since its creation, NIMH has played a key role in the formulation and
implementation of federal policy in the field of mental health. See SEGAL, supra note
121, at 28.
129. Schoonover & Bassuk, supra note 128, at 135.
130. See Rhoden, supra note 122, at 378-80.
131. Nordwind, Developing an Enforceable "Right to Treatment" Theor for the Chronically Mentally Disabled in the Community, 8 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 642, 643 (1982).
Talbott states that "[a] development that directly benefited the lives of the seriously and chronically mentally ill residing in state hospitals, and perhaps the most
significant development ever in the history of institutional psychiatry, was the discovery in the 1950's, of effective psychopharmacological agents." J. TALBOTT, supra note
8, at 26.
The use of antipsychotic drugs has been criticized by some courts and commentators. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &IHosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1307 (recognizing abuse of the drugs); SEGAL, supra note 121, at 239 (criticizing the drugs as
"chemical straight jackets"). For a detailed discussion of the limitations of the "miracle" qualities of the antipsychotic drugs, see A. SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT: A RADICAL VIEW 79-94 (1977).
132. See TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 6, at 87-92.
133. Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35,
902(e)(2)(B), 95 Stat. 560 (1981); H. FOLEY, supra note 115; Schoonover & Bassuk,
supra note 128, at 135.
Rhoden comments on the CMHC Act as follows:
Once deinstitutionalization became a recognized social policy, legislatures acted to aid and encourage it. For example, in 1963, Congress
adopted the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health
Centers Construction Act, which represented the first comprehensive federal commitment to developing community residences and programs for the
mentally retarded and mentally ill. Under this act, community mental
health centers (CMHC's) qualified for federal funding if they offered certain services, including outpatient and inpatient care, emergency aid, transitional care and follow-up, and treatment for alcohol and drug abuse.
Such centers served a growing number of mental patients in the community. Other federal and state legislation has likewise emphasized and provided incentives for community care. Although it generally is agreed that
community mental health centers have fallen short of their promise, federally sponsored incentives to establish such centers clearly contributed to the
acceleration and widespread acceptance of deinstitutionalization.
Rhoden, supra note 122, at 383 (footnotes omitted).
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This important social legislation made possible the creation of community-based mental health services throughout the country. In
1965, the Medicare13 4 and Medicaid 3 5 programs were created, providing crucial funding for community-based mental health care.'

36

The combined effects of the CMHC Act, antipsychotic medications,
advances in treatment, increased funding, and the Medicare and
Medicaid programs added vital support to the growing professional
and lay perception that community-based treatment was preferable
to institutionalization.

37

The foregoing factors laid the groundwork for widespread deinstitutionalization, which began in the 1950's.138 The number of residents in state and county mental hospitals declined from 559,000 in
1955 to approximately 138,000 in 1980.139 For the first time, a significant percentage of the seriously mentally ill, for whom institutionalization was formerly the only alternative, could avail themselves of an
expanding array of services offered by community mental health centers. For example, outpatient psychiatric care grew significantly during this period.' 40 Other services became available such as
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395pp (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
135. Id §§ 1396-1396i.
136. See Rhoden, supra note 122, at 384-85.
137. See Goldman, supra note 114, at 130; Nordwind, supra note 131, at 643;
Rhoden, supra note 122, at 378-87. See also Pepper & Ryglewicz, Testimony for the
Neglected- The Mentally Ill in the Post-Deinsttutional'zedAge, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 388 (1982); J. TALBOTT,supra note 8, at 33. Some critics of the policy of deinstitutionalization argue that the primary force behind the movement was an effort by
the states to shift financial responsibility for the mentally ill to the federal government. See Rhoden, supra note 122, at 381-82; A. SCULL, supra note 131, at 151.
138. See Grob, supra note 113, at 15; TALBOTT, supra note 8, at 32-33.
139. Goldman, supra note 114, at 131. See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES/NAT'L INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH STA-

TISTICAL NOTE No. 154: TRENDS IN PATIENT CARE EPISODES IN MENTAL HEALTH
FACILITIES 1955-1977 (1980).

140. Id. at 130. Goldman states that
[i]t is widely accepted that between 1955 and 1975 outpatient care expanded rapidly while inpatient care remained relatively stable. During this
period, particularly from 1965 to 1975, outpatient clinics and community
mental health centers were established and expanded. This new availability of services accounts for most of the twelvefold increase in outpatient care
episodes. However, while ambulatory services grew dramatically, the rate
of inpatient care episodes remained relatively stable, at about 800 to 850
...per 100,000 population ....
Some of the growth in outpatient care represents the aftercare of discharged hospital patients. Yet most outpatients today have had no prior
inpatient experience and have not shifted their locus of care; they simply
have availed themselves of new services. Our clinical experience fails to
support belief in the ready substitution of ambulatory services for hospitalization. Outpatient services, however, may permit a reduction in the length
of hospitalization, contributing to the decline in inpatient days of care since
1955. Without question, outpatient services have become a major part of
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day hospital services,1 42

crisis intervention, outreach, and short stay residential treatment.
Many of the patients still requiring hospitalization chose care in the
growing number of private psychiatric hospital beds, 143 thus further
144
reducing utilization of public mental hospitals.
the mental health service system, but there is no evidence that episodes of
outpatient care have replaced episodes of inpatient care, particularly for the
chronic and severely disturbed patient.
Id.
See also L. BACHRACH, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION:

AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW

AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (NIMH, Series D, No. 4, 1976). "In 1955, about

half of the psychiatric patient care episodes in the Nation were in State mental hospitals, as contrasted with about one-fifth in 1971. Outpatient services accounted for
only 23 percent of psychiatric patient care episodes in 1955 but for 42 percent in
1971." Id. Bachrach concluded that the use of antipsychotic drugs, along with increased reliance on nursing homes, account for the shift in service delivery. Id.
141. Many chronically mentally ill individuals can be maintained in the community so long as they continue to take prescribed medications. Numerous community mental health centers maintain clinics for the prescription and monitoring of
medications for chronic patients. Many patients need no other contact with the
mental health system. See SEGAL, supra note 121, at 232-51.
142. See generally R. BUDSON, THE PSYCHIATRIC HALFWAY HOUSE (1978); G.
DIBELLA, G. WEITZ, D. POYNTER-BERG & J. YURMARK, HANDBOOK OF PARTIAL
HOSPITALIZATION (1982); Cotton, Psychiatric Care for the Deinstitutiona/izedPatient, in
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION (L. Bachrach ed. 1983); Johnson, Community Support Systems
for DeinstitutonahzedPatients, in DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION (L. Bachrach ed. 1983);
PARTIAL HOSPITALIZATION (R. Luber ed. 1979). See also S. SEGAL & U. AVIRAM,
supra note 121; Campanelli, Lieberman & Trujillo, CreatingResidentalAlternativesfor the
Chromcally Mentally Ill, 34 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 166 (1983).
Rehabilitation services are crucially important to the chronically mentally ill.
For a recent article on the subject by leading experts, see Anthony, Cohen & Cohen,
Philosophy, Treatment Process, and Principles of the Psychiatric Rehabilitation Approach, in
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION

(L. Bachrach ed. 1983).

143. See Bachrach, The Efects of Deinstitutionalkationon General HospitalPsychiatg,
32 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 786 (1981); Goldman, supra note 114, at 131;
Schoonover & Bussuk, supra note 128.
144. Professor Goldman and his colleagues stress that, while there has been a
decline in the number of patients in state hospitals, such institutions continue to play
a central role in the mental health system:
The data fail to demonstrate the absolute shift in the locus of treatment that is regarded as the hallmark of deinstitutionalization. What
emerges instead is the reality of deinstitutionalization-an expanding
mental health services system in which the relative role of public inpatient
insitutions has diminished dramatically while their absolute role has endured, albeit somewhat altered.
• . . The fall of the state mental hospital has been proclaimed because
of the decline in the resident census of state and county mental hospitals
from 559,000 in 1955 to approximately 138,000 in 1980. Yet this decline to
one quarter of the previous census does not mean the demise of the state
mental hospital because, as the census fell, admissions increased. Even today these institutions continue to provide 64 percent of all inpatient days of
psychiatric care. ...
The resident patient census of state and county mental hospitals fell
dramatically while admissions to these facilities continue to increase. In
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While many chronically mentally ill individuals left state hospitals during the initial period of deinstitutionalization, many did not
leave institutional life permanently. For hundreds of thousands of
these individuals, the movement brought not deinstitutionalization
but reinstitutionalization in a privately-owned nursing home.' 45 The
number of nursing home beds occupied by the mentally ill increased
' 146

significantly during this period of "deinstitutionalization.

Often

the conditions found in such facilities were the same as, or worse than,

147
those found in state hospitals.

Although there has been a significant expansion of communitybased services available to the mentally ill, and a concomitant decline
in the overall census of public mental hospitals, one observer has
noted that this "decline . . . does not mean the demise of the state

mental hospital because, as the census fell, admissions increased.
Even today these institutions continue to provide 64 percent of all
inpatient days of psychiatric care. .... ,,148 The phenomenon of decreased census but increased admissions is explained by the fact that
the number of short-term inpatient admissions increased.

49

1

For most

patients the state hospital is no longer the last stop. Rather, treatment is given to stabilize the patients and then an attempt is made to
integrate them back into the community, with support from community mental health services. 150
The deinstitutionalization movement thus had its genesis in an
amalgam of increasingly effective treatment methods and an awareness that institutions were often damaging to those within their walls.
The movement has had an ameliorative effect on the lives of
thousands of individuals and, while many serious problems remain,
on balance the movement has been positive.
other words, fewer patients received long-term custodial care in state and
county hospitals, but the number of short-term inpatient care episodes
increased.
Goldman, supra note 114, at 130-3 1.
145. See J. TALBOTT, supra note 8, at 36-37.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Goldman, supra note 114, at 131. See Platman & Booker, The New LongTerm Patient in the Public Mental Hospital: A Follow-Up, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 794
(1984).
149. Id.
150. This method of inpatient treatment and reintegration into the community
has been termed the "revolving door policy." See SEGAL, supra note 121, at 82. See
also Goldman, supra note 114, at 133.
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The Contributionof the Courts to Deinstitutionahkation

Primary credit for the deinstitutionalization movement lies with

the mental health profession. The courts entered the picture well after mental health workers had made substantial progress. While judicial opinion did not chart the course of the movement, it had a
significant impact, and played an important secondary role.
In the 1966 case of Lake v. Cameron ,151 Chief Judge Bazelon of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit grappled with
the issue of alternatives to involuntary institutionalization. Catherine
Lake, the plaintiff, was an elderly woman who suffered from chronic
brain syndrome associated with aging.'5 2 She had a tendency to
wander away from home and become lost and confused. One of the
psychiatrists who examined her stated that rather than institutionalization, she needed supervision and care to prevent her from "wandering off."1

53

Although such care could have been provided in the

community, the district court committed Mrs. Lake to St. Elizabeth's
Hospital as a person of unsound mind.' 54 Following commitment,
she filed a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ, but
instructed Mrs. Lake that she could reapply if she could establish the
availability of community-based facilities for her treatment. 55 In
other words, the trial court recognized that Mrs. Lake might have a
right to less restrictive, community-based care if it were available,
56
"but required her to carry the burden of showing [its] availability."
The court of appeals reversed and ruled that the burden rests with
the state to show the non-availability of community-based facilities.
This approach, requires the state to make "an earnest effort . . .to

review and exhaust available resources of the community" before de57
priving individuals of their liberty.
The Lake decision is an important early effort to limit institutionalization to those for whom less restrictive alternatives are not available. The opinion focused attention on the importance of community
placement; however, it stopped short of requiring the establishment of
community facilities. Under Lake, the state could meet its burden by
151. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
152. Id. at 658. It was determined at the district court level that Catherine Lake
suffered from "a mental illness with the diagnosis of chronic brain syndrome associated with Cerebral Arteriosclerosis ..

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

"

Id. at 659.

660.
658-60.
659.
660-61.
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investigating "available resources."'' 58 Nearly a decade passed before a
federal judge took the next crucial step: ordering the creation of community treatment facilities. In 1975, Judge Robinson held in Dixon v.
Weinberger' 59 that the statutes of the District of Columbia imposed a
duty on both the federal and District of Columbia governments to
establish alternatives to institutionalization in St. Elizabeth's Hospital.'60 The plaintiffs in Dixon argued constitutional as well as statutory theories in support of the right to community treatment. The
importance of the case is diminished somewhat by the fact that the
court limited its holding to the statutory theory. 16 1 However, it remains a landmark in the deinstitutionalization movement for ordering the creation of community-based treatment facilities.
The litigation culminating in the cornerstone of judicial opinion
in the field of deinstitutionalization, Wyatt v. St'ckney,' 62 began innocuously in 1970 as a dispute over money.' 63 Ninety-nine employees of
state-operated Bryce Hospital, located at Tuscaloosa, Alabama, were
fired due to funding cuts.' 64 Bryce Hospital was built during the
1850's, and was an archetypical example of what had gone wrong
with large institutions. Approximately 5,000 individuals were confined at Bryce at the time the litigation was commenced,' 65 yet the
staff was woefully insufficient in numbers and training to meet even
the basic needs of the inmates' 66 Dismissal of nearly 100 sorely
needed employees was the final insult.
The conditions present throughout the institution were unsafe
and dehumanizing. Patients lived in dormitories which were de' 67
scribed as "barn-like structures with no privacy."'
[T]he wards were overcrowded; there was no furniture
where patients could keep clothing; there were no partitions
158. Id. at 660 (emphasis added).
159. 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975). Dixon was decided in 1975. However,

implementation of the court's requirement of community-based facilities took several
years. In 1979, the government finally submitted an implementation plan. In 1980,
a consent order designed to implement the original decision was issued. See MENTAL
HEALTH LAW PROJECT, SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES, JULY 1979-JUNE

1981 6 (1981).

160. 405 F. Supp. at 978-79.

161. 405 F. Supp. at 976.
162. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.),enforced, 334 F.Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
orders entered, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),ajdin
part, rev'd and remanded inpart sub nom, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.

1974).
163. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir. 1974).
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id at 1307.
325 F. Supp. at 782.
334 F. Supp. at 1343.
Id.
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between commodes in the bathrooms. There were severe
health and safety problems: patients with open wounds and
inadequately treated skin diseases were in imminent danger
of infection because of the unsantitary conditions . . . such
as permitting urine and feces to remain on the floor .... 168

Buildings were fire and safety hazards, 69 and poor ventilation caused
living areas to smell of excrement, stale urine, and unwashed bodies.' 70 Food was inedible.'71 Residents were often placed in physical
restraint for long periods of time purely for the convenience of the
staff, and unsupervised isolation in solitary confinement was an everyday occurrence. 172 Injury, sickness, abuse and misery were pervasive,
and meaningful treatment was nonexistent. The conditions at Bryce
in 1970 were perhaps worse than those described by Charles Dickens
in 1842.173 Certainly any excuse available during Dickens' time
based upon lack of scientific and practical knowledge of mental illness
and its treatment was unavailable in 1970.
Such were the institutional conditions which gave rise to the litigation in Wyatt v. Stickney.' 74 In this seminal litigation, then District
Judge Frank M. Johnson 75 took far-reaching steps to correct the horrendous conditions at Bryce. He did so by holding that involuntarily
committed patients enjoy "a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to
be cured or to improve his or her mental condition.' 76 This constitu168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
notes 1-5
174.

503 F.2d at 1310.
334 F. Supp. at 1343.
503 F.2d at 1310; 334 F. Supp. at 1343.
334 F. Supp. at 1343.
503 F.2d at 1310-11.
For Dickens' description of the conditions of institutions in the 1800's, see
and accompanying text supra.
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). For the procedural history of Wyatt v.

Stickney, see note 162 supra.

175. Judge Frank M. Johnson is now a Circuit Court Judge on the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
176. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where one
could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense." . . . The purpose of

involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment and not mere
custodial care or punishment. This is the only justification, from a constitutional standpoint, that allows civil commitments to mental institutions such
as Bryce.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). There are numerous authorities discussing the right to treatment for mental patients. See, e.g., Rapson, The Right of the
Mentally Ill to Receive Treatment in the Community, 16 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 192,
219-22 (1980); Rachlin, The Influence of Law on Deinstitutionahization, in DEINSTITU48-49 (L. Bachrach ed. 1983); Developments, supra note 61, at 1316-33.

TIONALIZATION
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tional right was termed a "present" right that could not be postponed
until adequate funds became available. 77 Failure to provide constitutionally mandated treatment could not "be justified by a lack of
78
operating funds."
In discussing the right to treatment, Judge Johnson identified
"three fundamental conditions for adequate and effective treatment
programs in public mental institutions."'' 79 These were: "(1) a humane psychological and physical environment, (2) qualified staff in
numbers sufficient to administer adequate treatment and (3) individualized treatment plans."1 80 At the time of the district court decision,
Bryce Hospital did not satisfy any of these conditions. The court
therefore ordered the defendants to prepare a plan to bring the institution into compliance with minimally adequate standards of treatment."" When the state failed to come up with an acceptable plan,
the court was compelled to impose its own. The court's standards
were exceedingly detailed, covering such matters as physical facilities,
staffing ratios, nutrition standards, the content of individualized
treatment plans, and limitations on the use of restraints and
seclusion. 182
During the course of the Wyatt litigation, the plaintiffs expanded
the scope of the case to embrace Partlow State School and Hospital, a
state institution for the mentally retarded.1 8 3 Conditions at Partlow
were in some respects more deplorable than those at Bryce. 84 In his
decision regarding the mentally retarded inmates at Partlow, Judge
Johnson held that "[i]n the context of the right to appropriate care
for people civilly confined to public mental institutions, no viable distinction can be made between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded."' 85 Judge Johnson stated that once the mentally retarded
person is committed he becomes "possessed of an inviolable constitutional right to habilitation."'18 6 Because conditions at Partlow fell far
below constitutionally required standards, the court imposed a set of
minimum standards similar in most respects to those which it applied
177. 325 F. Supp. at 784-85.
178. 344 F. Supp. at 377, enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781.
179. 334 F. Supp. at 1343.

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id. at 1344.
See 344 F. Supp. at 376-86.
344 F. Supp. 387, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
184. See id. at 391. For a detailed discussion of the conditions at both Partlow

and Bryce, see Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d at 1310-12.
185. 344 F. Supp. at 390.

186. Id.
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to the mentally ill. 187
The Wyatt v. Stickney litigation is important for several reasons.
From a social policy perspective, the decision was instrumental in focusing national attention on the plight of the institutionalized mentally ill and mentally retarded. From a pragmatic point of view, the
case had a direct impact on conditions within institutions across the
country. The case also marked the beginning of intense judicial scrutiny of nearly all aspects of institutional life. Following Wyatt, right
to treatment cases were instituted in several other jurisdictions.' 8 Finally, the decision had an important influence on the deinstitutionalization movement. This is so despite the fact that the court did not
concern itself directly with the discharge of patients from the institutions under scrutiny. It would be difficult-probably impossible-to
implement the minimally adequate conditions required by the court
in institutions the size of Bryce and Partlow. 8 9 As a result, the decision spurred the transfer of patients out of institutions and into community-based alternatives.
Some critics argue that Wyatt v. Stickney and cases like it do not
go far enough. In an article concerning institutionalization of the
mentally retarded, Professors Mason and Menolascino argue that
"[i]nstitutions, by their very structure-a closed and segregated society founded on obsolete custodial models-can rarely normalize and
habilitate the mentally retarded citizen to the extent of community
programs."0 By concentrating their efforts on improving conditions
within institutions, the authors contend, courts missed the essential
point that the rights they were seeking to protect simply can not be
effectively exercised or protected within institutional walls.' 9' Institutions are per se antithetical to the concept of treatment and habilitation in the least restrictive setting. Therefore, they argue that it is a
187. See id. at 395-407.

188. See, e.g., Rapson, supra note 176, at 220-22 (discussing the constitutional
basis of right to treatment); Developments, supra note 61, at 1316-33 (discussing cases
involving statutory and constitutional right to treatment issues).
189. At the time of the Wyatt litigation, Bryce Hospital housed approximately
5,000 patients, most of whom had been involuntarily committed through civil proceedings before the probate court of Alabama. 325 F. Supp. at 782. At that time,
Bryce employed 1,500 persons, only 931 of whom were involved in direct patient care
and therapy. Id. at 782-83. For a further description of the conditions at Bryce, see
notes 162-73 and accompanying text supra. At Partlow, the staff was inadequate and
the hospital 60% overcrowded. 503 F.2d at 1310-11. Four patients at Partlow died
due to these conditions. See id. at 1311 & n.6.
190. Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatmentfor Mentally Retarded Citizens:
An Evolving Legal and Scientif Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 124, 156 (1976).
191. Id. at 156-58.
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non sequitur to state that constitutionally acceptable care can be rendered in such settings.
The above reasoning was adopted by a federal court in Halderman
v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital.192 The district court opinion in
Pennhurst represents the zenith of deinstitutionalization litigation. Established in 1908, Pennhurst, like so many other state institutions for
the intellectually handicapped, was "overcrowded and understaffed."'' 93 During the early 1960's, it housed nearly 4,000 residents,
though at the time of the litigation the population had been reduced
to approximately 1,230.' 94 Psychological testing revealed that residents lost basic social skills while institutionalized at Pennhurst.
They regressed rather than progressed.' 95 Physical conditions in the
institution were reminiscent of those found at Bryce and Partlow. 9 6
All parties involved in the case were "in agreement that Pennhurst as
an institution [was] inappropriate and inadequate for the habilitation
97
of the retarded."'
Based on the record before it, the court could have fashioned a
remedy similar to that in Wyatt v. Stzckney.' 98 Judge Broderick, however, went beyond the earlier case. He reasoned, as did Judge Johnson in 4'yatt,199 that residents of Pennhurst had a constitutional right
to habilitation. Judge Broderick reasoned that when a "state involuntarily commits retarded persons, it must provide them with such
habilitation as will afford them a reasonable opportunity to acquire
and maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as their
192. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aj'dinpart,rev'd in part, andremanded, 612

F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d
Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
For a detailed discussion of Pennhurst, see Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionahlzation:
The Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN. L. REV. 717 (1979). See also Ferleger,AntiInstitutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 595 (1983); Rhoden,

supra note 122, at 406-10. One important reason for the effectiveness of early deinstitutionalization litigation was that families of institutionalized residents were nearly
unanimous in their support of the litigation. This unanimity has evaporated, however, and in some cases family groups are opposed to deinstitutionalization efforts.
See Frohbuese & Soles, ParentalOpposition to Denstitutionahzzation, 4 LAW AND HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 1 (1980). See also Rhoden, supra note 122, at 406-10.
193. 446 F. Supp. at 1302.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. For a description of the conditions which existed at Bryce and Partlow, see
notes 162-72 & 184 and accompanying text supra.
197. 446 F. Supp. at 1304.
198. For a discussion of the remedy fashioned by the court in Wyatt v.Stickney,
see notes 175-81 and accompanying text supra.
199. For Judge Johnson's ruling on the constitutional right to treatment, see
text accompanying notes 176-85 supra.
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capacities permit. '200 In addition, habilitation had to be provided
"under the least restrictive conditions consistent with the purpose of
the commitment. 20 1 The judge concluded that he could not reconcile institutionalization in Pennhurst with the principle of habilitation in the least restrictive alternative.
In the court's words,
"[M]inimally adequate habilitation cannot be provided in an institution such as Pennhurst. ' 20 2 That being so, the court had no alternative but to order the eventual closure of the institution. In the final
analysis, the court concluded that "Pennhurst, as an institution... ,
should be regarded as a monumental example of unconstitutionality
with respect to the habilitation of the retarded. ' 20 3 Although the Pennhurst case, in which Judge Broderick announced his landmark order,
is still being litigated, 20 4 it constitutes an important and lasting contribution to the body of caselaw defining the rights of the mentally ill
and mentally retarded.
There has been a plethora of litigation in recent years seeking
both to improve institutional conditions and move patients into the
community.2 0 5 This litigation has spurred legislative reform 20 6 and
changes in social policy. Thus, the law has played an important,
though secondary, role in the deinstitutionalization movement.
C.

Treatment 'nthe Least Restrictive Environment

The litigation concerning deinstitutionalization and involuntary
commitment has given rise to the constitutional requirement that
treatment be provided in the least restrictive environment. 20 7 The
200. 446 F. Supp. at 1317-18.
201. Id. at 1319.

202. Id. at 1318.
203. Id. at 1320.
204. In 1982, the Third Circuit affirmed Judge Broderick's decision, but based
its judgment on Pennsylvania law grounds. 673 F.2d 647, 656 (3d Cir. 1982). The

Supreme Court determined that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to order injunctive relief against Pennhurst officials on the basis of state law, and remanded the case
to the Third Circuit to consider whether there is a constitutional or federal statutory
basis which would support the judgment. 104 S.Ct. 900, 921 (1984).
205. See Rapson, supra note 176, at 205-06; Rhoden, supra note 122, at 385-87.
206. For a discussion of the legislative reform movement, see Rachlin, supra note
176, at 41-42, 44-46; Rhapson, supra note 176, at 203-05.
207. See generally THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES (H. Turnbull ed. 1981). See also Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In Pennhurst, Judge Broderick stated:
Once admitted to a state facility, the residents have a constitutional
right to be provided with minimally adequate habilitation under the least
restrictive conditions consistent with the purpose of the commitment.
All admissions to state facilities, be it through court commitment, or
otherwise, entail an infringement on fundamental rights and free-
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roots of the doctrine of least restriction can be traced to Shelton v.
Tucker,20 8 a 1960 case in which the Supreme Court addressed the issue of state intrusion upon first amendment rights.2 0 9 The Court
stated that
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means
210
for achieving the same basic purpose.
In the context of involuntary commitment of the mentally ill, the
governmental purposes are the protection of society and the provision
of treatment designed to alleviate suffering and return the patient to a
fulfilling life in the community. Although these purposes are undoubtedly "legitimate and substantial," involuntary treatment nevertheless constitutes a "massive curtailment of liberty. ' 2 11 Courts have
found that the liberty lost through commitment is as fundamental as
the first amendment rights at stake in Shelton v. Tucker. Therefore,
doms .... Because of this, due process demands that if a state undertakes
the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive
setting consistent with that individual's habilitative needs. As we have
heretofore pointed out, isolation and confinement are counter-productive in
the habilitation of the retarded. Furthermore, since the law recognizes that
habilitation other than in the least restrictive setting is a violation of one's
constitutional rights, there is no question that Pennhurst, as an institution
for the retarded, should be regarded as a monumental example of unconstitutionality with respect to the habilitation of the retarded. The Commonwealth and its subdivisions have a constitutional duty to explore and
provide the least stringent practicable alternatives to confinement of retarded individuals at Pennhurst.
446 F. Supp. at 1319-20 (footnote and citation omitted).
It should be noted that the Supreme Court overturned the district court Pennhurst decision on other grounds. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and
Hosp., 451 U.S. 1 (1981). The Supreme Court has yet to squarely address the constitutional violations found by Judge Broderick. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900 (1984).
208. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
209. At issue in Shelton v. Tucker was an Arkansas statute requiring teachers to
file annually affidavits listing all organizations to which they previously belonged or
donated money. Filing of the affidavits was a condition to employment in statesupported schools or colleges. 364 U.S. at 480. The Supreme Court held that the
statute violated the teachers' right to freedom of association, protected by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 487.
210. 364 U.S. at 488 (footnotes omitted).
211. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). See also O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (there is no constitutional basis for confining the
mentally ill involuntarily if they are not dangerous and can safely live in freedom);
Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979) (describing
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when the state undertakes to treat the mentally ill against their will, it
must do so by means calculated to avoid unnecessary infringement of
liberty. In practical terms, this means that treatment must be provided in the least restrictive environment which can effectively meet
the individual's treatment needs. 21 2 Because institutionalization entails use of one of the most restrictive treatment modalities available,
it can only be justified if less restrictive treatment, such as commu21 3
nity-based therapy, would not be effective.
the enormity of the deprivation and the denial of the right to freedom caused by
hospitalization).
The California Supreme Court described the potentially devastating affect of
commitment upon the individual:
[C]ivil commitment to a mental hospital . . . threatens a person's liberty

and dignity on as massive a scale as that traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions. One has only to imagine the horror experienced by a
competent person falsely committed as mentally disturbed in order to appreciate that freedom is openly on trial at a civil commitment proceeding.
Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 223, 590 P.2d 1, 3, 152 Cal. Rptr. 424, 427
(1979).
212. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 379 ("[platients have a right to the
least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of commitment"); Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1096 (mentally ill persons cannot be deprived of freedom if
there are less drastic means for achieving the same basic goal). See also Comment, The
Scope of the Involuntarily Committed Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment with Psychotropic Drugs.- An Analysis of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine, 28 VILL. L. REV. 101,
134-39 (1982).
213. The application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine to the police
power andparenspatriaepower standards for involuntary commitment is described by
one authority as follows:
The threshold determinations of mental incapacity or substantially diminished responsibility required for parens patriae or police power commitments are not affected by the application of least restrictive alternative
analysis. For both types of commitment, these findings serve to justify treating the mentally ill differently from those who are not mentally ill. Inparens
patriae commitments, moreover, the initial determination of incapacity is
required to identify the individual as properly subject to state authority.
Since reducing the deprivations of commitment would eliminate neither the
need to justify the differential treatment of the mentally ill nor the inherent
limitation of the parens patriae power to protection of incompetents, the
threshold standards for commitment would not be altered by less burdensome alternatives to hospitalization.
Least restrictive alternative analysis also leaves unchanged the balancing standard forparenspatriaecommitments. By requiring that the state act
in its ward's best interest, the parenspatriaedoctrine compels an evaluation
of potential means of protecting the incapacitated individual. If the incremental benefits of institutionalization are not sufficient to outweigh the increased loss of liberty when compared with an available alternative, the
state's duty as parens patriae is to choose that alternative. Least restrictive
alternative analysis provides an independent constitutional basis for this
duty.
Developments, supra note 61, at 1248-49 (footnotes omitted).
For a discussion of a recent article questioning the utility of least restrictive alternative analysis in the context of involuntary treatment, see note 272 infra.
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The deinstitutionalization movement has wrought sweeping
changes in the manner in which society cares for the mentally ill. Social planners, mental health professionals, legislators, and judges have
played important roles in the movement. In many respects the mentally ill have been well served by their efforts. The movement has not
been without shortcomings, however, and, as will be seen in the next
section, it has failed in certain respects.
IV.
A.

FAILINGS OF THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION MOVEMENT

The "Community's" Failureto Provide Adequate Community-Based
Treatment Resources

Thousands of mentally ill individuals have been released into the
community through the process of deinstitutionalization. For many,
the welcome afforded by society has been cold. 21 4 As one commenta-

tor has noted: "Today a large number of the returnees can be found
in nursing and board-and-care homes, in 'welfare' hotels, and in flophouses."' 21 5 Many more are living and dying on the streets of every
214. Rhoden offers the following penetrating observation:
It is not unusual for the proponents of a policy to optimistically overestimate its benefits, ease of implementation, and cost effectiveness. However,
in this case the inflated rhetoric may have contributed to the current
problems with deinstitutionalization by implying that being in the community was per se therapeutic. Advocates frequently suggested that "keeping
[persons] out of institutions, even if the community is not geared to serve
them, is all to the good." Such rhetoric obscured both the difficulties inherent in establishing community facilities and the desperate need for such
facilities. It also misrepresented the nature of the community to which most
ex-patients would return; had the "community care" movement been called
"subsistence in slums," there might have been a more widespread recognition that mere release to the community would not be enough. Similarly,
had advocates considered the treatment that many of the mentally disturbed had received back in the golden age before institutions, they might
have questioned the wisdom of releasing patients first and creating community programs afterwards. After all the institution itself was a reform
designed to protect the mentally ill from neglect and abuse in the
community.
Rhoden, supra note 122, at 400-01 (footnotes omitted). See Deistitutionahzationof the
Mentally Ill. Heanngs Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Affairs and Health ofthe House Comm. on
the Distric of Columbia, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Deinstitutionalization Hean'gs]; L. BACHRACH, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: AN ANALYTICAL REVIEW AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (NIMH Series D. No. 4, 1976). Bachrach
observes that chronically mentally ill individuals are sometimes considered "undesirable" by professionals and community members alike. She stresses the fact that
many deinstitutionalized patients fail outside the hospital because they have not been
adequately prepared for life in the community. See also Lamb, Roots ofaNeglect ofthe
Long-Term Mentally IIl, 42 PSYCHIATRY 201 (1979); Talbott, Toward a Public Policy on
the Chromc Mentally Ill Patient, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 43 (1980).
215. J. TALBOTT, supra note 8, at 36. See Gordon & Lazarus, NewJersey's Rooming and Boarding House Act.- Its Effects and Effectiveness, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 484
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city.216

(1982); Lehman, Ward & Linn, Chronic Mental Patients. The Quality of Life Issue, 139
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1271 (1982).
Rapson described the housing problem as follows:
Housing, the core of any community-based treatment plan, is the most
striking testament to the breakdown of deinstitutionalization theory.
Whether gathered in nursing homes, adult homes, single-room-occupancy
hotels, or left to find a vacant bench or unoccupied subway heating duct,
countless thousands of mentally ill persons find themselves in environments
in which their most basic psychiatric and resocialization needs cannot be

met.
Rapson, supra note 176, at 207-08 (footnotes omitted).
One commentator states that NIMH data show there are between 800,000 and
1.5 million chronically mentally ill persons living in the "community." Of this
number, approximately 65% return to their families following discharge from the
hospital. Goldman, Mental Illness and Family Burden. A Public Health Perspective, 33
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 557, 558 (1982). However, many have no family
to which to return. Even those who do return to the family may not stay, or may not
be welcome. Caring for a seriously disabled adult imposes a tremendous strain on the
entire family. Not infrequently, the strain is too much for all concerned, and the
mentally ill individual finds him or herself in a hospital or on the streets. The system
of involuntary treatment proposed in this article should enable mental health professionals to aid families that are attempting to support mentally ill members in the
community.
216. See Rhoden, supra note 122, at 391-92. Rhoden states as follows:
Some former patients are not even so fortunate as to have a dirty room
in a crumbling [single residency occupancy hotel (SRO)] in which to live.
Mental patients who have been evicted from their SRO, or have in some
other way "fallen between the cracks," and failed to negotiate the bureaucratic requirements for receiving financial assistance may wind up literally
on the streets. It has been estimated that in New York City alone, approximately 30,000 homeless men sleep on doorsteps, unoccupied benches, heating ducts, or other such places. The New York City subway system has
been called "the largest SRO" in existence. Large number of the homeless
are mentally ill, and they are without a doubt the ultimate victims of our
carelessly enacted mental health reforms. Such persons frequently are
preyed upon by criminals or the violently disturbed, and they die in disproportionate numbers. Some incidents gain notoriety, such as the mentally ill
young Vassar graduate who lived at Union Station in Washington, was not
committed because she was not dangerous, and was soon found brutally
stabbed near her "home." Many more such incidents go unreported because no one cares.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Rhoden notes statistics which show that 50-70% of the men
inhabiting some of New York's shelters for the homeless evidence signs of mental
illness. Id. at 391 n.88.
The problem of the homeless mentally ill was described poignantly in another
article:
Among those who are utterly disaffiliated, madness may compound the
hardships of street life to produce a new class of misfits-the so-called
"space cases." Their transience, the chronicity of their afflication, the fact
that available services are ill-suited to their needs, community fear of and
distaste for their numbers, and their alleged propensity for violence all conspire to keep them beyond the pale of traditional outreach measures. Nor
should the hazards of a marginal existence in the community be underestimated. One study of 119 "new chronic" patients discharged after short hospital stays and referred to aftercare clinics, reported an astonishing 4.2%
suicide rate for the group.
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Some commentators have cogently suggested that the practical
effect of deinstitutionalization is to make the community the functional equivalent of the hospital:
[W]hen a chronically mentally ill person leaves a psychiatric
hospital, the community becomes, in effect, that person's
hospital. That is, the community must then provide, in
some fashion, all of those aspects of hospital care that are
noncustodial in the restrictive sense: financial support, lowcost housing, employment or vocational rehabilitation, socialization, recreation, a degree of protection and supervision, advocacy and [case] management, medication, crisis
2 17
intervention, and psychotherapy.
This array of services is essential if the seriously impaired are to live
with any degree of dignity and well-being in the community. The
services which are actually available, however, are all too often woefully inadequate. 2 18 This is due in large measure to a lack of ade... In New York City, for example, homelessness has emerged in recent years as a problem of major proportions. Official estimates of the
number of adults periodically or permanently homeless have run as high as
36,000, while the city's emergency sheltering capacity stands at about 4000
beds. In critical respects, this is a new phenomenon. The past decade has
seen not only an increase in size but a radical transformation in the ranks of
the homeless. Women now appear on the streets in growing numbers;
young men now comprise the majority of the Bowery's population; chronic
alcoholism is no longer the dominant scourge of the homeless (if it ever
was); and the presence of the large numbers of severely disturbed and disabled street people is obvious to even the most casual passerby. "Treatment" for such groups may be a luxury when survival is a day-to-day
question.
Professionals are not alone in their distress. The visibility of a large
and diversified population of street people is cause for acute concern on a
number of fronts, including the popular press. Concern, however, has yet to
be translated into effective means of assistance.
Baxter & Hopper, The New Mendcancy: Homeless in New York City, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 393, 393-94 (1982) (footnotes omitted). See also Homeless and Hungry, 18
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 11-32 (1984); Homeless in Amertca, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1984, at
20.
217. Pepper & Ryglewicz, Testimony for the Neglected

The Mentally Ill in the Post-

Deznstitutionahized Age, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 388, 389 (1982).

218. For a discussion of the inadequacy of community services for the mentally
ill, see H. WILSON, DEINSTITUTIONAI.IZED RESIDENTIAl. CARE FOR THE MENTALI.Y
DISORDERED 110-11 (1982); Bachrach, An Overview of Deinstitutionah'zation, in DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 5, 10-13 (L. Bachrach ed. 1983); Nordwind, supra note 131, at
648-49; Rapson, supra note 176, at 206-17; Rhoden, supra note 122, at 387-414. For a
former patient's perspective on the needs of the chronically mentally ill, see Peterson,
What are the Needs of Chronic Mental Patients?, 8 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 610 (1982).
While community-based services for the chronically mentally ill are inadequate,
research indicates that community mental health centers are devoting increasing resources to care of chronic patients. See Runck, Data Show Increase in CHMCServicesfor
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quate funding for community programs. "In the simplest terms, the
patients from [the] state hospitals have been discharged into the com'2 19
munity, but the dollars to support their care have not followed.
Many former state hospital patients are now languishing in nursing homes.220 For most of these individuals, life is little different than
when they were hospitalized. There is seldom adequate psychiatric
care beyond administration of medication. The nursing home has, in
effect, become the new "back ward" for the chronically mentally ill.
The age of deinstitutionalization has witnessed a growing
number of younger mentally disabled adults "who are not
deinstitutionalized but uninstitutionalized. '22 1 These individuals
have not experienced long periods of institutional care, but have been
treated with varying degrees of success in the community mental
health system. 22 2 "These young adults, roughly in the age group 1835, who may be intermittently psychotic and who are severely and
persistently impaired, both psychiatrically and socially, . . .grow up

spending little if any time in psychiatric hospitals, and most of their
time in the stressful life of the community. '223 Many of these
individuals
live in the community in mental and emotional states
which, in the past, would have brought about their hospitalization. Although they are diverted [from hospitalization]
to alternative programs such as day hospital, they may or
may not follow through on such alternatives, and in most
224
states they are under no legal constraint to do so.

Many of these younger patients are in dire need of treatment, but for
a variety of reasons either refuse treatment or cannot find it.225
Chronic Patients.- Some Other Services Decrease, 35 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY

219 (1984).
219. Pepper & Ryglewicz, supra note 217, at 389. See J. TALBOTT, supra note 8,
at 38 (discussing the current inadequacies of treatment and care of the mentally ill);
Homeless in America, supra note 216, at 28.

220. See Rapson, supra note 176, at 210-11; Goldman, supra note 114, at 134.
221. Pepper & Ryglewicz, supra note 217, at 389 (emphasis in original). For an
excellent demographic profile of the homeless in America, see Lipton, Sabatini &
Katz, Down and Out tnthe City. The Homeless Mentally Ill, 34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 817 (1983).
222. For a moving example of the failure of the community mental health system, see Eisenhuth, Profiles of Street People: Mark X, 34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 809 (1983).
223. Pepper & Ryglewicz, supra note 217, at 389.
224. Id. at 389-90.
225. Id. at 390. Pepper & Ryglewicz describe the growing number of younger
patients:
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In their in-depth report titled Homelessness in America, Hombs and
Snyder describe vividly the growing tragedy of thousands of former
mental patients living on the streets of America's cities. 226 The authors estimate that between one-third and one-half of these homeless
are former mental patients. 2 27 They describe the deplorable conditions in which many of these individuals live:
By the hundreds of thousands, patients have been discharged and sent to unfit, unsafe, or unlawfully operated
boarding homes and flop houses, without the necessary supportive medical or social aftercare services ....
Since depopulation of America's mental asylums began, the majority of the state mental hospital patients have
been released into a world unprepared or unwilling to care
for them. They are the victims of a social reform movement
aimed at liberating them. Many are now living, and dying,
in alleys, parks, vacant lots, and abandoned buildings, with
little more than garbage for food, rags for cloths, and no
228
shelter or medical care whatsoever.
The magnitude of the problem created by society's failure to provide
adequate community facilities and treatment, along with workable
channels for access to care, cannot be overemphasized. The toll in
terms of human suffering is incalculable. To appreciate the human
tragedy involved, it seems appropriate to consider a case example reported by Hombs and Snyder:
While nearly all categories of psychiatric patients are affected by these
policies, our young adult patients present the most dramatic risks, both to
themselves and to their communities. They typically present recurrent crises and only intermittent engagement in treatment. As a group they show:
1) a low rate of hospitalization; 2) a high incidence of use of alcohol and
other drugs; 3) a high incidence of suicide attempts as well as of successful
suicides; 4) a high incidence of conception of children, who become our next
high-risk generation; 5) a sizeable incidence of law violations involving violence; 6) for the majority, a history of mental health treatment before age
18; and 7) for the majority, a high or total degree of financial dependence
on public assistance programs or on family. These are some of the characteristics that make this new, uninstitutionalized generation a high-risk,
high-priority, and high-anxiety group, both for professionals and for the
public.
Id.

226. M. HOMBS & M. SNYDER, HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA (1982). See also
Street People.- HearingBefore a Subcomm. on the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983); Rhoden, supra note 122, passim.
227. M. HOMBS & M.

SNYDER, supra

note 226, at 44.

228. Id. at 43. See also Haugland, Craig, Goodman & Siegel, Mortality in the Era
of Deinstitutionalzation, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 848 (1983).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984

41

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29: p. 367

In the coldest days of January 1982, Rebecca Smith,
age 61, died of hypothermia in New York City. She was
living in a rug-covered cardboard box on the corner of
Tenth Avenue and West 17th Street.
In the days and weeks before her death, she was visited
by at least 50 people who offered her food and shelter. Two
weeks prior to her death, the Red Cross had informed police
of her living arrangements. Following that, she was approached by . . . a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist declared
her an "endangered adult" under the first application of
New York's Protective Services Law. She died a few hours
before the implementation of a 72-hour protective custody
order could take effect.
Rebecca Smith came to the ranks of New York's homeless from a different sort of life. She was one of thirteen children; she was valedictorian of her class at the prestigious
Hampton Institute in her native Virginia . . . . Rebecca
was hospitalized as a schizophrenic. ...
She came to New York in 1959 to live with her sister.
Again she was hospitalized. For the next 20 years, she was
in and out of hospitals and clinics. During that time, she
was heavily drugged. In 1981, she failed to appear for recertification interviews, and thereafter-having lost her public
assistance and other benefits-she lived on the streets.
On a public street corner, her human vulnerability to
the cold overwhelmed her. She was visible-yet not-to
countless people. There were repeated offers of help, official
and otherwise. It is telling that, after all of those visits, according to one city official, "Little was known about her
other than her name." As is so often the case, we learned
the most about her only after her death. We do not know if
she understood these offers of assistance or not; custody
229
came too late.
The story of Rebecca Smith illustrates a social problem of immense proportions. Hundreds of thousands of mentally ill individuals
have been released from state hospitals into the community. Many of
these individuals are seriously and chronically disabled and unable to
survive safely and with dignity unless they receive appropriate community-based mental health services.
229. M. HOMBS & M.

SNYDER, supra note
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While the "community" has undeniably failed in its responsibility to establish adequate community-based treatment resources for
the mentally ill, one should not lose sight of the tremendous advances
of the past twenty-five years. Community-based resources are available on an impressive scale in many communities, and mental health
professionals continue to improve treatment methods for the chronically mentally ill. Much remains to be done before the deinstitutionalization movement can be termed a success, but progress continues.
As the following section illustrates, however, the law may stand as an
obstacle in the path of further achievement.
B.

The Shortcomings of Dezistitutionahziationare Exacerbatedby Restrictive
Involuntary Commitment Laws

During the past fifteen years, there has been a steady trend toward greater restriction of state authority to provide involuntary
treatment to the mentally ill.23 0 Considerable judicial and scholarly
criticism has been leveled at the parens patriae authority as a vehicle
for the imposition of treatment. As a result, it is now extraordinarily
difficult for the state to compel treatment except in the most extreme
cases. While this outcome undoubtedly protects liberty interests, it
has led to the de facto abandonment of many seriously mentally ill
people. It is so difficult to provide involuntary treatment to those in
need of care that thousands go without.
When the results of the deinstitutionalization movement are
combined with the highly restrictive commitment statutes found in
most states, the result is a crisis of serious proportions. Thousands of
individuals living in the community, who are in undisputed need of
treatment, are left to their own devices. Many of them are simply
unable to cope with life in the community and, as a result, suffer unnecessary physical deprivation and psychological injury.
The crisis precipitated by the concurrent developments of deinstitutionalization and restrictive commitment laws is compounded by
the fact that existing involuntary commitment schemes fail to address
the crucial issue of community-based treatment. Current law offers a
dichotomous system under which there are but two alternatives: total
"freedom" from involuntary treatment, or total institutionalization in
the restrictive environment of a hospital. The array of communitybased mental health services is ignored by current commitment law.
The system does not allow the authority charged with the involuntary
treatment decision to pick the therapeutic alternative which will be
230. See generally Rhoden, supra note 122, at 405-06.
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most effective and, at the same time, least restrictive of personal liberty. The result can only be described as a major system failure; and
failure that leads inevitably to tragic cases such as that of Rebecca
2 31
Smith.
While specific standards, practices, and procedures vary from
state to state, a fairly uniform system for the delivery of involuntary
2 32
treatment to the mentally ill is in effect throughout the country.
This system grew and matured in the era of institutions. 233 During
this period, which lasted from the mid-nineteenth century until the
1960's, there was an extremely limited array of alternatives available
to an authority faced with the decision whether to order involuntary
treatment. The person could be involuntarily committed to an institution or left at liberty without treatment. Statutes regulating involuntary treatment were an all or nothing proposition. 234 This system
of involuntary commitment is understandable when viewed from an
historical perspective. During most of our history there was no middle ground between institutionalization and non-interference by the
state.2 35 As legislatures enacted statutes to govern involuntary treatment, they did so necessarily in the context of then-current theory
and practice in the mental health field. Since the only form of treatment was institutionalization, involuntary commitment statutes were
couched in terms of hospitalization versus freedom.
Contemporary statutory schemes for involuntary treatment of
the mentally ill may thus be seen as a product of a bygone era. When
viewed in the light of current knowledge and practice, the entire involuntary treatment scheme appears to be an anachronism, for the
231. Several states have enacted provisions that permit mental health authorities to release involuntarily committed patients from the hospital to less restrictive
community-based treatment while they remain under court order. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 47.30.200 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-21 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 64-7-43 (1983 Supp.). See also Stromberg & Stone, A Model S/a/e Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 383-84 (1983). While such
statutes are an improvment over the traditional commitment statute, they do not
solve the problem because they require initial commitment to the hospital before release to less restrictive treatment can be authorized. The proposal for involuntary
community-based treatment espoused in the instant article would not require initial
hospitalization.
232. This article discusses both involuntary commitment and involuntary treatment. "Involuntary commitment" is limited to involuntary "commitment" to a hospital. "Involuntary treatment" is a broader concept, embracing numerous types of

community-based treatments.
233. For discussion of the historical development of involuntary commitment
law, see text accompanying notes 35-60 supra.

234. For discussion of typical commitment statutes allowing only commitment
to hospitals, see notes 35-60 and accompanying text supra.
235. For an historical discussion of the treatment of the mentally ill, see text
accompanying notes 1-34 supra.
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presently available range of treatments goes well beyond institutionalization. For the law to restrict involuntary treatment to the single
alternative available in the past is to ignore the array of treatments
and treatment settings now available; yet, that is precisely what involuntary commitment statutes do.
Continued reliance on an outmoded involuntary treatment
scheme has several harmful effects. Most significantly, patients in
genuine need of treatment outside the hospital do not receive it since
there is no way to afford it to them if they refuse. Thus, patients who
could be maintained adequately in the community if they were to
attend group therapy sessions or take prescribed medications go without essential treatment. There is no workable method under current
law to require such individuals to participate in community-based
therapy. At the same time, it is neither desirable, nor presently legally possible, to involuntarily commit such individuals.
Another harmful effect of current statutes is that seriously impaired individuals who could survive safely in the community with
appropriate treatment are sometimes involuntarily committed because they refuse care. When voluntary treatment is refused, mental
health professionals and family members are left with no alternative
to institutionalization. In such situations, current statutes actually
encourage commitment of individuals who may not be suitable for
institutional care, seriously undercutting the doctrine of least restriction. Judges faced with such cases may stretch the commitment criteria in order to extend care to those who appear to be in serious need,
but who could function adequately in less restrictive treatment
settings.
The North Carolina Legislature recognized the shortcomings of
the traditional involuntary commitment system, and, in 1983, enacted a statute authorizing involuntary commitment to outpatient
treatment. 236 The North Carolina commitment scheme, which became effective on January 1, 1984, sets a standard for other states to
2 37
emulate.
236. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.2(8), 122-58.4(c)(2), (e), 122-58.5(b), 12258.6(a), 122-58.6A, 122-58.7A:1, 122-58.8, 122-58.10A, 122-58.10B, 122-58.11A(c)

(1983 Cum. Supp.).
237. The North Carolina Division of Mental Health/Mental Retardation and
Substance Abuse Services has been studying the issue of involuntary treatment in the
community for several years. Division officials came to the conclusion that it is essential to provide involuntary treatment in the community as well as in the hospital.
Authorization of community-based treatment should help break the cycle of periodic
rehospitalization that so frequently occurs with the chronically mentally ill. Telephone interview with Ms. Angie McMillan, Special Assistant in the North Carolina
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ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM OF

INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL

When the shortcomings of the deinstitutionalization movement
are combined with the exceedingly strict standards of the current generation of involuntary commitment statutes, the result is a critical
failure to provide essential mental health services to a large and growing number of seriously impaired people. In light of this failure, it is
necesary to determine whether anything can be done to remedy the
situation. There are at least five alternative solutions: (1) abolish involuntary treatment of any kind; (2) attempt to fine-tune the present
system; (3) utilize guardianship law to appoint guardians empowered
to authorize treatment on behalf of incapacitated individuals; (4) employ adult protective service statutes to afford treatment to those at
risk; or (5) create a system of involuntary treatment for persons incapable of rational decisionmaking which would require treatment in
the least restrictive setting, and which would permit hospitalization
only as a last resort.
Division of Mental Health/Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services (Apr.
13, 1984).

The North Carolina Commitment statute defines outpatient treatment as
follows:
"Outpatient treatment" may include medication; individual-or group therapy; day or partial day programming; services and training including educational and vocational activities; supervision of living arrangements; and
any other services prescribed to either alleviate the person's illness or disability, to maintain semi-independent functioning, or to prevent further deterioration that may reasonably be predicted to result in the need for
inpatient commitment to a mental health facility.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.2(8) (1983 Cum. Supp.). Involuntary outpatient treatment may be ordered if the following criteria are satisfied:
a. The respondent is mentally ill, and
b. The respondent is capable of surviving safely in the community with
available supervision from family, friends or others, and
c. Based on the respondent's treatment history, the respondent is in need
of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration
which would predictably result in dangerousness . . . , and
d. His current mental status or the nature of his illness limits or negates
his ability to make an informed decision to voluntarily seek or comply
with recommended treatment.
Id. § 122-58.4(c)(2). These criteria may permit involuntary treatment in circumstances where it would not be available under the proposal espoused in the instant
article. North Carolina permits intervention where rational decisionmaking capacity
is limited or negated, whereas my proposal allows it only in the latter case. See notes
293-94 and accompanying text infra.
The North Carolina statute sets forth detailed procedures to be followed in involuntary community-based treatment cases. It also creates mechanisms for periodic
review of treatment orders.
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A.

Abohtion of Involuntary Treatment

Several able authorities, among them Doctor Thomas Szasz, 2 38
have advocated abolition of involuntary treatment. The arguments
of these scholars are well documented elsewhere,2 39 and will not be
reviewed at length. It is sufficient to say that the abolitionists combine a basic preference for liberty with a pervasive distrust of psychiatry's ability and will to limit treatment to those who are
unquestionably in need. 240 Professor Morse summarized many of the
arguments with these words:
In sum, for a variety of reasons-the desire to control
deviance, difficulties in the proper definition and diagnosis
of mental disorder, vagueness of commitment standards, difficulties in accurately predicting future behavior, and procedural laxity-the involuntary civil commitment system will
produce unacceptably high numbers of improper commitments and thus will continue to function as an unjust

system .24I
Although the abolitionsts' arguments are appealing at first blush,
they must be rejected for at least two reasons. The first is pragmatic.
While the mere existence of a system can never be sufficient justification for its continued use, it cannot be ignored that the system of
involuntary commitment is operating in one form or another in every
state. The overwhelming majority of mental health professionals believe that the system, while far from perfect, is performing a useful,
242
beneficent, and necessary function in society.
The second reason is premised on a fundamental disagreement
238. Dr. Szasz has written and edited several books on mental illness. See THE
AGE OF MADNESS (T. Szasz ed. 1973); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY
(1963); T. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); T. SZASZ, THE MYTH
OF MENTAL ILLNESS (rev. ed. 1974). See also Szasz, On the Legitimacy of Psychiatric
Power, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 479 (1983).
239. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 122, at 404-06.
240. See id.
241. Morse, supra note 51 at 78 (1982). For authorities on the issue of prediction
of dangerous behavior, see, e.g., J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL
HEALTH (C. Frederick ed. 1978).
242. See Caton, Effect of Length ofInpatient Treatmentfor Chronic Schiiophrenia, 139
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 856 (1982). Caton argues that the need for hospitalization has
not been eliminated by the growth of community services. Even in effective community-based treatment programs, the rate of rehospitalization is as high as 60%. Id. at
856. See also Chodoff, The Casefor Involuntaqy Hospitahizationof the Mentally 11, 133 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 496 (1976); LaFond, supra note 58; Rachlin, supra note 176, at 43-44;
Roth, A Commitment Law for Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1121 (1979).
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with the abolitionists. A convincing argument can be advanced that
mental illness does in fact exist, that it can rob its victims of the power
of rational decisionmaking, that individuals so affected simply will
not and cannot protect their own best interests, 243 and that as a humane society we have an obligation-medical, legal, and moral-to
treat such individuals, even against their will. If this is accepted as
true, it follows that some form of involuntary treatment is necessary
244
until the day arrives when mental illness is eliminated.
B.

Fie Tuning the Present System

•

The present system of involuntary commitment is tied to hospitalization. It does not embrace the full panoply of therapeutic alternatives currently available. In this respect, the present system is
outmoded and unresponsive to the needs of patients. Rather than
adhere tenaciously to a system whose time has passed, society should
move forward to a more flexible scheme that reflects current concepts
of mental illness and available treatment alternatives.
C.

GuardianshipLaw

The law of guardianship has evolved to provide for the appointment of substitute decisionmakers when the personal or financial interests of incapacitated individuals require protection. 24 5 It can be
argued that since most state statutes allow a guardian to consent to
ordinary medical care on behalf of a ward, 246 the guardian also
should be entrusted to decide whether to submit the ward to mental
243. For arguments against these propositions, see Morse, supra note 51, at 6465.
244. Rhoden responds to the abolitionists by pointing out that they underesti-

mate the suffering which results from a lack of proper treatment. He states that there
are times when
lawyers may have overemphasized liberty, and consequently ignored the
needs of severely ill patients unable to recognize their need for treatment ....
Opponents of all involuntary commitment would do well to ask
themselves whether the emphasis on liberty does not sometimes lead to
unacceptably great sacrifice of health, safety, and well being.
Rhoden, supra note 122, at 405-06.
As early as 1750, Benjamin Franklin described the quality of life of many mentally ill individuals who were too ill to seek treatment voluntarily: "[Flew or none of
them are so sensible of their Condition, as to submit voluntarily to the treatment that

their respective Cases requires and therefore continue in the same deplorable state

during their Lives .... .' " A. DEUTSCH, supra note 6, at 59 (quoting Franklin's petition to the provincial assembly for a hospital).
245. See generally 39 AM. JUR. 2d, Guardianand Ward §§ 61-64 (1968).
246. The Uniform Probate Code provides that "a guardian of an incapacitated
person is responsible for care, custody, and control of the ward . . . . [Such] guardian has the same duties, powers and responsibilities as a guardian for a minor."
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-309, 8 U.L.A. 471 (1983). Section 5-309(c) provides in part:
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health treatment. Since most guardians are close family members
and presumably have the patient's best interest in mind, they should
be in a position to make correct and responsible decisions.
. There are, however, several reasons why the law of guardianship
is poorly suited to the purpose of providing involuntary treatment to
the mentally ill. Guardians do not necessarily possess the desire or
the ability to balance the intrusion of treatment against the liberty
interests of the individual. 247 In the typical case, the guardian will be
the very individual seeking to impose treatment. Therefore, he or she
lacks the disinterested objectivity of a judge, who can more fairly
weigh the competing interests. The fact that family members frequently serve as guardians militates against affording them the authority to require treatment, for individuals so close to the situation,
and with such a personal stake in the outcome, can hardly be expected to pay proper deference to the wishes of the proposed patient.
Sometimes a close family member is not available to serve as
guardian, and a distant relative or agent of the state may be appointed. 24 In such cases there is no assurance that the guardian will
have the well-being of the ward in mind when making decisions. The
decision to impose treatment could turn on the level to which the
guardian finds him or herself out of patience with, or inconvenienced
by, the ward.
As a practical matter, a guardian would not be able to implement a substituted decision regarding treatment if the ward refused
to participate. The guardian would probably have to seek the assistance of the civil commitment system to effectuate treatment. For the
foregoing reasons, 249 the law of guardianship does not offer a useful
tool to provide involuntary community-based treatment to the mentally ill.
"A guardian may ... consent to medical or other professional care, treatment, or
advice for the ward." Id. § 5-209(c)(4), 8 U.L.A. at 452-53.
247. See Rhoden, The Right to Refuse PsychotropicDrugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 363, 402-06 (1980). On the issue of sterilization of the mentally disabled, courts
and legislatures have recognized the conflict of interest faced by guardians, and have
determined that the decision whether to authorize sterilization must be made by a
court, not a guardian. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34 §§ 2471-2487 (Supp.
1982-83); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 64-10-1 to -16 (Supp. 1983); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235,
426 A.2d 467 (1981); In re A.W., 202 Colo. 263, 637 P.2d 366 (1981).
248. Family members are sometimes indifferent to the fate of a mentally ill relative. See Homeless in America, supra note 216, at 23 (a woman found living on the
streets in Philadelphia just a block from her daughter's apartment).
249. It has also been suggested that proceedings for the appointment of guardians are too lengthy to be useful. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1363 (D.
Mass. 1979), affdmpart, rev'dthpart,vacatedand remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980),
vacated and remandedsub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
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D. Adult Protective Services Statutes
Over the past ten years, a movement toward enactment of adult

protective service statutes (APS) has emerged. 250 More than half the
states have adopted some form of APS statute. 251 Legislative action
grew out of an awareness that thousands of disabled and older adults

are the victims of abuse, neglect, and exploitation at the hands of
family members, "friends," and caretakers. 252 In some respects, the
APS statutes are modeled after the child protective service and child
abuse reporting statutes that swept the country during the 1960's.253
Of the legal mechanisms currently available, APS statutes offer the

best hope of providing necessary treatment for the mentally ill.
Although APS statutes vary significantly from state to state, all
are designed to protect a class of adults incapable of protecting them-

selves from abuse, neglect, or exploitation. 254 The statutes express a
preference for voluntary protective services, 255 and stress service in

the least restrictive environment consistent with individual liberty
and freedom of choice. 256 Many of the APS statutes contain provi250. See Horstman, supra note 92.
251. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 38-9-1 to -11 (Supp. 1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46-451 to -452 (Supp. 1983-84); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600-15631 (West
Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-3-101 to -114 (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31,
§§ 3901-3910 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 410.10 to 410.11 (West Supp. 1983);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, §§ 4161-4172 (Supp. 1983-84); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 209.010-.150 (Supp. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403.2 (West Supp. 1984);

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3470-3487 (Supp. 1983-84); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 19A, §§ 14-26 (West Supp. 1983-84); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557 (1983 & Supp.
1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 161-D:1-6 (Supp. 1983); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§§ 473-473a (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108A-99 to -111 (Supp. 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 410.610-990 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-29-10 to -100 (1976); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN.
§§ 48.001 to 48.084 (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-19-1 to -10 (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.124.010 to .124.900 (Supp. 1983-84); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 55.001 to 55.07 (West Supp. 1983-84); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-20-101 to 108 (Supp. 1983).
252. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3471 (Supp. 1983-84). The legislature observed that "many adult citizens of the State, because of incapacitation, are
unable to manage their own affairs or to protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
exploitation or physical danger." Id.
253. See generalo ABA, PROTECTING CHILDREN THROUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM
(1981).
254. Most of the statutes permit intervention only when an incapacitated person
becomes the victim of abuse, neglect, or exploitation. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:403.2 (West Supp. 1984) (purpose of statute is to protect incapacitated adults
who are adversely affected by abuse or neglect).
255. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3481-3482 (Supp. 1983-84).
Under the Maine statute, consent of the abused adult is sought in the first instance.
If consent is not obtained, protective services are not rendered unless it can be shown
that the adult "lacks capacity to consent." Id.
256. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3201 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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sions for emergency services. 257 Under some, services can be provided
involuntarily on court order. 258 Many require use of existing guardi2 59
anship provisions when involuntary services become necessary.
Nearly all APS statutes require that persons who know or suspect instances of abuse, neglect, or exploitation report them to designated
2 60
law enforcement or social services officials.
The APS statutes define the range of protective services quite
broadly. The Wisconsin statute, for example, lists the following as
protective services: outreach, counseling and referral for services, provision of case management services, legal counseling or referral,
guardianship referral, and diagnostic evaluation. 2 6 ' The Wisconsin
statute also lists protective placement as one of the available services. 2 62 Many statutes do not articulate a list of services, leaving to
professional judgment the determination of what is essential to pro2 63
tect the individual at risk.
Almost without exception, the primary purpose of the APS statutes is to remove incapacitated adults from situations involving physical or mental abuse, neglect, or exploitation of resources. To the
extent the statutes are limited to these purposes, they are not satisfactory as a device to provide therapeutic services to the mentally ill.
While it is certainly true that the APS model will be useful in many
instances to protect the mentally disabled, involuntary treatment
may be necessary in cases involving none of the APS triggering
events. Furthermore, statutes which require appointment of a guardian must be rejected for the reasons outlined above. Finally, the APS
statutes were not enacted to address the problem under discussion.
Their provisions and procedures are not responsive to the special
needs of the mentally ill. While some of the statutes could be
amended to incorporate appropriate standards and procedures, 264 the
§ 4 10.101 (Supp. 1983). For a discussion of the origins of the "least restrictive" alternative requirement, see notes 207-13 and accompanying text supra.
257. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A §§ 14, 20 (West Supp. 1983-84).
258. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3906 (Supp. 1982).
259. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-3-107 (1982).
260. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.557 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
261. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 55.04 (West Supp. 1983-84).
262. Id. § 55.06.
263. Two states' APS statutes provide that they may not be used to commit an
individual to a mental hospital involuntarily. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161-D:2
(Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-105(c) (Supp. 1981).
264. Some APS statutes contain excellent standards for determining the competence or mental capacity of the mentally ill individual. Others provide no standards
or poorly drafted standards. Compare Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 209.010-.150 (Supp. 1980)
(no standards given) with WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 55.01, 55.06(2)(c) (West Supp. 198384) (incapacitated persons include those suffering from developmental disabilities,
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wiser course is to leave the APS statutes as they are, and address the
problem of involuntary treatment squarely in the context of a distinct
body of involuntary commitment law.
E.
1.

A Proposalfor Aleration of the Sys/em of Involuntary Civil
Commitment

Overview of the Proposal
The present system of involuntary commitment is seriously de-

fective because it fails to address the need for community-based involuntary treatment for some mentally ill individuals. Thousands of
seriously ill people who previously would have been hospitalized are
now living in the community. Many are involved in treatment on
their own accord. Others are capable of community living without
treatment. Still others may need treatment, but in the exercise of
rational judgment choose to forgo it. The proposal which follows is
not intended to apply to these groups of individuals. Respect for autonomy mandates that those capable of rational decisionmaking be
allowed to choose their own course. 265 They must be permitted to

accept or reject therapy as they desire.
The alternative proposed below focuses on the group of mentally
ill persons who, because of their mental illness, lack or have lost the
intellectual capacity to engage in a rational decisionmaking process
regarding whether to accept mental health treatment.266 Under the
infirmities of aging, chronic mental illness who are "so totally incapable of providing
for [their] own care or custody as to create a substantial risk of serious harm to [themselves] or others").
265. For a discussion of the need to preserve freedom of choice for the rational
mentally ill, see Developments, supra note 61, at 1212-14. See also Stromberg & Stone, A
Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 276
(1983). The Stromberg & Stone article sets forth and comments on a model commitment statute. The statute, which was the result of extensive drafting and research,
was approved in 1982 by the American Psychiatric Association. Id. at 279. It authorizes commitment under both parens patriae and police power rationales, and establishes extensive procedural and substantive safeguards against unwarranted
commitment.
The APA model statute is an excellent effort to provide workable guidelines for
involuntary treatment of the mentally ill. It is respectfully submitted, however, that
the model does not satisfactorily address the problem of community-based involuntary treatment. The model continues the traditional adherence to hospitalization as
the principle method for provision of involuntary treatment. The model makes provision for conditional release from the hospital to outpatient treatment. Id. at 383-84.
However, its primary focus remains on hospitalization. The proposal espoused in the
instant article, on the other hand, authorizes commitment to a broader range of
treatment alternatives. See text accompanying notes 268-71 infra. Commitment to a

hospital would be permitted only if less restrictive alternatives would not be therapeutically effective.
266. For discussion of the requirement of incompetence to decide whether to
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proposal, a finding of incapacity is a condition precedent to involuntary treatment.2 67 Furthermore, treatment can only be ordered when
the individual's living conditions constitute a present danger to his or
her psychological or physical well-being. Finally, treatment must be
provided in the setting that will be effective from a clinical standpoint, but least restrictive of personal liberty. Thus, involuntary
treatment will be provided in the community if at all possible. Comaccept treatment, see Stromberg & Stone, supra note 265, at 301-02. Under the APA
model statute, a proposed patient must lack capacity to make an informed decision
concerning treatment. The statute defines the capacity as follows:
[Tihe person by reason of his mental disorder or condition, is unable, despite conscientious efforts at explanation, to understand basically the nature
and effects of hospitalization or treatment or is unable to engage in a rational decisionmaking process regarding such hospitalization or treatment,
as evidenced by inability to weigh the possible risks and benefits.
Id. at 301. The authors offer the following commentary on the standard:
Before assessing a patient's capacity or lack thereof, the treatment team
must conscientiously try to explain the nature and effects of the proposed
hospitalization or treatment to the patient. When appropriate, the treatment staff may enlist the aid of a patient's family, friends, clergy, or others.
A person lacks capacity if, due to his mental disorder or condition, he
cannot understand the basic nature and effects of the proposed hospitalization or treatment. A person does not lack capacity simply because he refuses treatment, which he might do, for example, because he is a Christian
Scientist or is risk averse (being excessively so in the physician's opinion).
The Model Law makes lack of "capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment" a specific criterion for involuntary commitment ...
Where the issue of capacity arises in a commitment proceeding, the court
makes the determination .

. .

. Understanding requires a fundamental ap-

preciation of those aspects of the proposed treatment that a reasonable person would find significant in decisionmaking. A patient need not
understand every technical feature of a proposed therapy.
Even if an individual can understand the nature and effects of treatment, he lacks capacity if, due to his mental disorder or condition, he cannot engage in any rational decisionmaking process because, for example, he
is unable to weigh the risks and benefits of the proposed therapy. The definition requires inability to engage in any rational process, not simply the
one that the physician or court would employ. Rational modes of thinking
may be unusual, eccentric, or even inconsistently related to reality. A patient's phobia, for example, might distort his apprehension or appreciation
of particular facts without impairing his ability to reason concerning other
facts or decisions. Another patient's delusions, however, might broadly impair his ability to reason. An individual afflicted with a severe mental disorder may be unable to pay attention to and assimilate information, or his
disorganized thoughts may preclude him from engaging in anything resembling a rational process. Only this type of patient lacks capacity under the
Model Law.
Id. at 301-02 (footnotes omitted). See also Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F.
Supp. 424, 429-32 (D. Utah 1979); A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SysTEM IN TRANSITION 66-69 (1975); LaFond, supra note 58, at 504-06; Developments,
supra note 61, at 1212-19.
267. See Developments,supra note 61, at 1212-19 (a finding of incapacity should be
a "threshold requirement" for treatment).
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mitment to the restrictive environment of a hospital will only be used
if less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective.
To conceptualize the proposed involuntary treatment scheme, it
is helpful to picture a continuum, with treatment modalities arrayed
along a line from the least to the most restrictive. The continuum is
not rigid. No particular therapeutic intervention is affixed inexorably
to a specific position. Rather, certain forms of therapy will be more
or less restrictive depending upon the patient involved. 268 Despite the
flexibility of the continuum, it is possible to array some of the currently available therapeutic techniques along its trajectory.2 69 Close
to the least restrictive end of the continuum are outreach and crisis
intervention services available on the basis of individual need.
Slightly further in the direction of restriction is outpatient psychotherapy. The antipsychotic and other medications can be found at all
points along the continuum, but are placed near the center for purposes of illustration. Further along the continuum are communitybased day-hospital services and partial hospitalization. Next comes
short-term residence in a small, unlocked, residential treatment facility. At a position approaching the restrictive end of the continuum is
hospitalization. Near the end is electro-shock therapy. Finally, at a
point completely off the scale, is psychosurgery.
A system of involuntary treatment which is to be effective in caring for patients must embrace the entire continuum of available treatments. As advances are made in the treatment of mental illness, they
should be incorporated into the system as promptly as they are accepted by practicing professionals. The principal shortcoming of the
present involuntary commitment system is that it ignores options
along the continuum save for hospitalization-one of the most restrictive alternatives.
The essential need to incorporate the full continuum of treatment modalities into the system of involuntary treatment leads to the
proposal espoused in this section. Simply stated, the entire treatment
continuum should be available to the state authority responsible for
268. See Deinstitulionaizatt'onHearings, supra note 214, at 155-67 (statement of
John A. Talbott, M.D.).
269. Id. Doctor Talbott is a leading authority on deinstitutionalization. In his
remarks before the Subcommittee, he discussed community-based living arrangements for the mentally ill. As an appendix to his testimony, he attached a figure
demonstrating the spectrum of optimal treatment services and living situations. The
figure is reproduced below to assist in illustrating the concept of an array of treatment alternatives:
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deciding whether to require treatment. 2 70 To be responsive to the
unique needs of each individual, the court would impose the degree
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d. at 167, Figure 2.
270. Nothing in existing law precludes implementation of a system of involuntary treatment along the lines proposed in this article. See R. ROCK, M. JACOBSON &
R. JANOPAUI., HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY hi. (1968).

The authors state:
It is a significant fact that American law concerning treatment of the mentally ill implicitly-and in many jurisdictions explicitly-links mental illness with hospitalization. The notion of compulsory non-institutional
treatment for mental illness is legally inchoate in this country, although
there is nothing in our legal traditions that makes it obnoxious. In current
practice the legal processes for identifying and dealing with those who re-
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of treatment which would be (1) effective in returning the individual

to a mental state in which he or she possesses the capacity to engage
27
in rational decisionmaking regarding whether to accept treatment, '
and (2) least restrictive of personal liberty. 272 To accomplish these
goals, the treatment of choice is the therapeutic intervention, or combination of interventions, that will satisfy both requirements. The
task of the court is to move along the continuum, beginning at the
point of least restriction, until the appropriate intervention is
reached. Once the least restrictive, effective therapy is isolated, it is
ordered. Anything less restrictive would be ineffective. More restrictive treatment would be unnecessary and violative of the constitu273
tional principle of less drastic means.

It can be argued that it is unrealistic to build a commitment
system on the principle that treatment alternatives are measurable in
quire the intervention of mental treatment are legal processes that look to
hospitalization.
Id. at 2.

271. Some individuals are so seriously and permanently disabled that no
amount of treatment will permit them to engage in rational decisionmaking. For
such individuals, long-term custodial care is sometimes necessary. Others can live in
the community so long as they are financially and therapeutically supported. For
patients in need of custodial care, the conditions of care must be humane, safe and
pleasant. Treatment must be provided to maintain skill levels possessed by such patients. Care should be provided with the least restriction of liberty and autonomy
that is consistent with safety.
272. For a discussion of the principle of least restrictive alternatives, see text
accompanying notes 207-13 supra.
In a recent article, three leading experts in mental health law cast doubt on the
utility of least restrictive alternative analysis in the context of involuntary treatment.
See Gutheil, Appelbaum & Wexler, The Inappropriatenessof "'LeastRestrictive Alternative"
Anaysis for Involuntaty Procedures With the Instit'utionahzedMentally 111,11 J. PSYCHIATRY

& L. 7 (1983). The authors point out that a continuum of restriction cannot be rigid.
They state as follows:
It seems likely that treatments are more or less restrictive according to the
needs of the patient for whom they are employed: an unnecessary treatment is always highly restrictive, but the restrictiveness of an indicated modality varies with the degree of freedom it is likely to restore to the patient
who receives it. It is difficult to imagine how restrictiveness can be judged
except on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 12 (emphasis in original). The instant proposal is consistent with the teachings
of Professors Gutheil, Appelbaum, and Wexler, since it requires the judge to base a
decision ordering involuntary treatment on the unique facts of the case and the particular treatment needs of the patient. Reaching appropriate individualized decisions that are consistent with the principle of least restriction will not be a simple
matter; however, it can be done. For an opinion questioning this proposition, see
Stromberg & Stone, supra note 265, at 292. See also Hoffman & Foust, Least Restrictive
Treatment of the Mentally Ill." A Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1100, 1103-04 (1977); McGraw & Keilitz, The Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrinein Los
Angeles County Civic Commitment, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 35 (1984).

273. See notes 207-13 supra.
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terms of restrictiveness. 2 74 Inappropriate restriction for one individual is therapeutic for another.2 75 Most would agree, however, that
the level of restriction necessary for effective intervention is accertainable in individual cases. So long as the system eschews creation of a
rigid continuum of restrictiveness, 276 and instead embraces a flexible
approach designed to assess the treatment needs of individual patients, it should be possible to reach correct results that will comport
with both therapeutic goals and constitutional mandates.
There are important advantages to the proposed system of involuntary treatment. The proposal comports with the present reality of
mental health treatment. The day is past when the only alternative
was institutionalization. The proposal would replace the old system
with one which is flexible and contemporary. Another obvious advantage is that the mentally ill would be afforded necessary treatment
in the setting least restrictive of their personal liberty.
Adoption of an involuntary treatment system along the lines suggested should reduce the need for hospitalization. In the past, patients were often subject to prolonged hospitalization, sometimes for
274. See Stromberg & Stone, supra note 265, at 291-94, 330-88. Stromberg and
Stone argue that it is neither therapeutically beneficial to the patient nor analytically
useful to the court to create a rigid, "hierarchical array of less-to-more restrictive
facilities" and mechanistically pidgeon hole patients into the least restrictive placement. Id. at 291. Restrictiveness is only half the equation; the other half is the therapeutic effectiveness of the treatment. They point out that
it may be less constraining for a patient to participate for thirty days in an
effective therapeutic program in a "restrictive" institution than to be
treated for a year in a less effective "community" program. The reverse also
may be true. The point is that there is probably "no relationship between
restrictiveness and [treatment] effectiveness, let alone a stable or singular
one." What is or is not in the patient's interests cannot be measured on a
simplistic scale of restrictiveness.
Id. at 292.
While a system of involuntary treatment cannot focus solely on the level of restriction of liberty in making treatment choices, neither can it ignore this important
factor. The key to a responsive commitment system is an amalgamation of the twin
requirements of therapeutic effectiveness and least restriction. If two treatment settings are equally effective in returning a patient to appropriate functioning, and one
is more restrictive of personal liberty than the other, then principles of medicine,
psychology, and law dictate choice of the less restrictive. The proposal set forth in
this article requires simultaneous consideration of these two crucial factors. The task
of the court, aided by expert testimony, is to choose the therapeutic alternative that is
effective and, at the same time, least restrictive of liberty and autonomy. To do so,
the court draws from the entire continuum of currently available treatments. Unlike
most contemporary commitment statutes which limit the court to hospitalization, the
proposal expands the array of choices and creates much more flexibility for creative
consideration of both restrictiveness and effectiveness. Level of restriction is not accorded "talismatic legal significance" but it is not ignored either.
275. See Gutheil, Appelbaum & Wexler, supra note 272, at 12.
276. Id.
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many years. 2 77 As a result of the deinstitutionalization movement,
278
Despite the
the number of long-term hospital residents decreased.
overall decline in the number of hospitalized patients, however, the
aggregate number of hospital admissions increased. 279 This phenomenon can be accounted for in part by the fact that a large number of
chronically-ill individuals experience periodic exacerbation of their
symptoms. When decompensation occurs, hospitalization is sometimes necessary.2 8 0 The cycle of re-hospitalization has prompted
some authors to describe these individuals as "revolving door" patients. 28 1 While the factors leading to decompensation and hospitalization vary, the cycle often begins when the individual drops out of
therapy or discontinues taking medication. Under the current
scheme of involuntary commitment, there is no way to require the
decompensating, hospital-bound patient to resume or participate in
the community-based therapy that could break the cycle and restore
him or her to satisfactory functioning. Presently, nothing can be done
277. See Grob, Historical Origins ofDeinstitutionahzation, in DEINSTITUTIONAIAZATION 21 (L.

Bachrach ed. 1983).

278. See text accompanying note 139 supra.
279. For a discussion of this statistical phenomenon, see text accompanying
notes 148-49 supra.
280. For a discussion of rehospitalization, see note 150 supra.
281. DeRisi & Vega, The Impact of Dethstitutionalizatonon California'sState Hospital
Population, 34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 140, 144 (1983). One author
states:
A major impact of de-institutionalization on the mental health system concerns the phenomenon of readmission. While the residual chronic population of state facilities decreased, total admissions continued to rise (until
1972) largely as a result of the increasing number of readmissions. This
phenomenon-more patients spending less time per episode in a hospital
but entering the hospital a greater number of times-is what the author has
described elsewhere as the "revolving door." Readmissions, which in 1969
had accounted for 47 percent of those entering state hospitals, by 1972 constituted 54 percent of all admissions. In some states the figures rose from 43
percent in 1963 to 70 percent in 1974. In some areas, such as New York
City, many professionals doubt whether any patient can be provided
prompt, effective and efficient psychiatric treatment if he or she is treated
by different facilities for either each particular episode of illness or for separate episodes.
J. TALBOTT, supra note 8, at 39.
Rhoden states that
[p]atients released to the community frequently fall victim to the "revolving
door" syndrome, moving to dilapidated hotels or residences, relapsing, and
than being rehospitalized, only to begin the cycle over again. Although
such patients spend fewer total days in hospitals, they may account for
many more admissions and readmissions. Thus the chronically ill patient
often moves from one inadequate environment to the next, the net result
being that what has been achieved is not deinstitutionalization but "transinstitutionalization" with the patient's locus of living and care transferred
"from a single lousy institution to multiple wretched ones."
Rhoden, supra note 122, at 390-91 (footnotes omitted).
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until the individual has decompensated to the point at which strict
statutory criteria for hospitalization are met. At that point the patient can be hospitalized, resulting in disruption of the patient's life
due to loss of employment, strain on interpersonal relationships, and
a sense of failure and regression. Under the proposed treatment system, a different result would obtain. If the patient lacked the capacity to rationally decide whether to accept treatment needed to
forestall hospitalization, appropriate intervention could be ordered in
time to maintain the individual at a level of functioning which
would, in many cases, keep him or her in the community. This result
would be beneficial in many respects. Most important would be its
great value to the individual, enabling him or her to continue working toward greater stability and success in the community. If the proposal were to accomplish nothing more than breaking the tragic cycle
of re-hospitalization for a substantial number of chronically mentally
ill individuals, then its implementation would be worthwhile.
Development in the law often lags behind social change. Deinstitutionalization and advances in the treatment of mental illness
have rendered the current scheme of involuntary commitment outmoded and anachronistic. The system ignores reality and fails to
meet the needs of the mentally ill. While it is not yet possible to
28 2
abandon hospitalization as one form of involuntary treatment,
neither is it wise or humane to ignore less restrictive forms of treatment. Adoption of the proposed system for involuntary treatment
should lead to creative restructuring of current law. Such restructuring promises to have a positive effect on the lives of the mentally ill.
2.

OperationalAspects of the Proposed System of Involuntay Treatment

a.

Procedural safeguards

The proposed system for involuntary treatment could be intergrated into the present scheme with relative ease. None of the procedural due process protections required by Lessardv. Schmidt and other
authorities would be abandoned. 283 Indeed, such protections would
become more important because the state would be intervening in
people's lives under circumstances where it cannot now do so. The
potential for abuse inherent in any system of involuntary treatment
requires strict adherence to the full panoply of procedural safeguards
articulated by the authorities.
282. See Ames, The Limits of GeneralHospitalCare: A ContinuingRole for State Hospitals, 34 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 145 (1983).

283. For a discussion of Lessard v. Schmidt, see notes 52-56 and accompanying
text supra.
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Judicial supervision of the system

Some writers take the position that decisions regarding involuntary treatment should be removed from the courts and turned over to
administrative bodies or mental health professionals. 2 4 In Parham v.
J.R. ,285 the Supreme Court seemed to move in this direction by holding that a minor may be involuntarily hospitalized by his or her parents without formal legal proceedings. The Court reasoned that
while due process requires the admitting psychiatrist to adhere to cernot mandate an adversarial proceedtain procedures, 28 6 the law does
2 7
ing with judicial supervision.

Although it is true that "neither judges nor administrative hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psychiatric judgments, '288 since an individual's freedom of choice and liberty
are at stake, it is essential that judges remain the decisionmakers for
adults. Experience teaches that the delicate balance between state
and individual interests can be accomplished best in the context of
adversarial proceedings in which a judge retains decisionmaking authority. This is especially important under the proposed system,
which will permit intervention earlier than is presently the case.
c.

Intervention is permitted only after efforts to secure voluntary
participation fail

Under the proposal, the state would be required to make a good
faith effort to involve the individual in voluntary treatment before
proceedings for involuntary care could be commenced. If these efforts failed, and the state commenced involuntary treatment proceedings, it would be required to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that it had made the required effort.
284. See TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 6, at 369.
285. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
286. Id. at 606-07. The Court required a neutral factfinder to ascertain whether
the statutory standards for institutionalization were met by "carefully prob[ing] the
child's background." Id. The Court required the factfinder to interview the child.

Id.
287. Id. at 607-12. The Court stated that the states were free to require formal
hearings, but that "due process is not violated by use of informal, traditional medical
investigative techniques." Id. at 607.
288. Id. at 607 (quotingln re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 942, 569 P.2d 1286, 1299
(1977) (Clark, J., dissenting)).
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Involuntary treatment may be ordered only when an
individual is likely to cause harm to him or herself, or
suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration

Critics of the proposed system of involuntary treatment will focus attention on the potential for abuse inherent in any scheme that
legitimizes interference in the lives of others. They will argue-and
not without merit-that well-intentioned mental health professionals
will use the system to impose treatment on individuals capable of
choosing to forego it. Their concerns bring to mind the words of Justice Louis D. Brandeis:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. .

.

. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious

encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
289
understanding.
It must be admitted that the proposal risks unwarranted state
interference. It will no doubt occur. However, it is submitted that
this risk is far outweighed by the benefits of an involuntary treatment
system responsive to the needs of the mentally ill. To reduce the potential for benevolent misuse of the involuntary treatment system, intervention would be permitted only where the mentally ill individual
lacks rational decisionmaking capacity, and where this incapacity
poses a clear threat to his or her psychological or physical well-being.
Substance can be added to this requirement, by adoption of the definition of harm employed in the American Psychiatric Association's
Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally J//.290 Under the

model statute, one of the criteria for involuntary commitment inquires whether the individual is likely to cause harm to him or herself
or suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration. Commitment
may be appropriate if
the person (1) is likely in the near future to inflict substantial physical injury upon himself, or (2) is substantially unable to provide for some of his basic needs such as food,
clothing, shelter, health, or safety, or (3) will if not treated
suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental,
emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is associated
289. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). The point has also been stated as follows: "It is no less possible to do injustice
to a person when undertaking to act on his behalf than when acting against him on
behalf of others." R. ROCK, supra note 270, at 7.
290. See Stromberg & Stone, supra note 265.
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with significant impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior causing a substantial deterioration of his previous ability
29
to function on his own. '

Under the proposed treatment system, mental illness alone

would not constitute sufficient ground for intervention. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's observation in O'Connorv. Donaldson292
that "the mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person
from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. '293 Furthermore, mental illness in combination with need for treatment
would not be sufficient to trigger interventon. Finally, mental illness
plus need for treatment plus lack of rational decisionmaking power
would not suffice. Only when these three factors are present in combination with the required level of threatened harm would intervention be permitted. The requirement of threatened harm should
reduce inappropriate intervention to acceptable levels.
e.

Lack of rational decisionmaking capacity

The proposed system of involuntary treatment is based on the
state'sparenspatriaeauthority to care for individuals unable to care for
themselves. In the context of mental illness, imposition of treatment
under theparenspatrzaerationale is appropriate only when an individual lacks the intellectual capacity to rationally decide whether to accept treatment. 294 Respect for autonomy and freedom of choice
require that individuals capable of rational decisionmaking be permitted to accept or reject therapy as they see fit. The determination
of capacity is central to the entire concept ofparenspatriaeinvoluntary
treatment. Therefore, the determination of this crucial issue must always precede the imposition of treatment. In order to comport with
principles of due process of law, the decision regarding capacity
should be a formal, judicial determination based on admissible evidence presented in the context of an adversarial proceeding. The
burden of proof must rest squarely on the state to prove incapacity by
29 5
clear and convincing evidence.
291. Id. at 302-03.

292. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
293. Id. at 575. The Court stated that "[a] finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's locking up a person against his will and keeping him indefinitely
in simple custodial confinement." Id.
294. For an overview of this aspect of the proposal, see notes 265-67 and accompanying text supra.
295. For an application of this aspect of the proposal, see Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1979) (a showing of incapacity by "clear, unequivocal and convincing"
evidence satisfies due process).
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(i) The danger of benevolent paternalism
Critics of involuntary treatment of the mentally ill are quick to
point out the danger that benevolent paternalism may run roughshod
over individual liberty. They cite examples in which personal rights
296
have been inappropriately sacrificed to paternalistic intervention.
These critics will argue that the changes proposed here will open the
door to further paternalistic intervention into the lives of the mentally
i1l.297

Critics raising the spectre of benevolent paternalism and social
control often fortify their position by relying on John Stuart Mill's On
Liberty.298 Professor Feinberg describes the "central thesis" of On Liberey to be

that the fully voluntary choice or consent of a mature and
raional human being concerning matters that affect only his
own interests is such a precious thing that no one else (and
certainly not the state) has a right to interfere with it simply
' 299
for the person's "own good.
Note the word "rational" in the quotation. Most philosphers agree
that there are occasions when paternalism is warranted-for example,
paternalistic intervention on behalf of mentally ill individuals incapable of "rational" decisionmaking. Professor Dworkin restates the
proposition in different words when he writes that "Mill intends his
principles to be applicable only to mature individuals. ' 300 In his
book, A Theory ofjutice, 30

1

Professor Rawls states the point as follows:

296. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 51.

297. Some may argue that this proposal opens not only a door to paternalistic
intervention, but a Pandora's box from which will emerge the ugly head of excessive
government control. To this I respond that the fact of unwarranted intervention in
some instances does not justify abandonment of the mentally ill. To quote Justice
Musmanno, "I would rather see the opening of a Pandora's box than the closing of a
coffin over an elementary principle of Justice." Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220
A.2d 650 (1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting). The combined failings of strict commitment statutes and deinstitutionalization deny basic equality and justice to thousands
of the most seriously mentally ill. While the proposal espoused in this article is far
from perfect, it goes some distance toward rectifying this gross injustice.
298. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
299. Feinberg, LegalPaternalism, 1 CANADIANJ. PHIL. 105, 111 (1971) (emphasis
added).
300. Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 118 (R. Wasserstrom ed.
1971). See also Husak, Patemah'sm andAutonomy, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 27, 46 (1980)

("Paternalism no longer appears to be a means by which one's autonomy is inevitably compromised"); Wikler, Paternahsm and the Mildly Retarded, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
377 (1979) (many mildly mentally retarded individuals are capable of independent

decisionmaking).
301.

J.

RAWLS,

A

THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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If mental disturbance causes individuals to be unable to "rationally
advance their interests . . . [o]thers [are] authorized and sometimes

required to act on [their] behalf and to do what [they] would do for
[themselves] if [they] were rational, this authorization coming into ef30 2
fect only when [they] cannot look after [their] own good.
The proposed system of involuntary treatment is consistent with
the predominant view that paternalism is sometimes called for on behalf of individuals lacking rational decisionmaking capacity. Unwarranted intervention will be avoided by strict adherence to the
procedural and substantive safeguards built into the system. These
requirements are supportive of the position that "paternalism should
be allowed only when the impairment is likely to have undesirable
consequences for the agent. ' 30 3 The undesirable consequences which
befall thousands of the seriously mentally ill are undeniable; there302. Id. at 249.
303. Hodson, The Prnctple of Palemaism, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 61 (1977). Professor
Hodson begins his article by specifying some of the cases about which there seems to
be agreement that paternalistic intervention can be justified. Id. at 61. The "cases"
he describes are as follows:
Ignorance. Cases involving potential harm of which the threatened person is unaware provide clear examples of paternalistic coercion widely
thought to be justified. For instance, it is thought to be unobjectionable to
forcibly prevent children from getting themselves into dangerous circumstances which they do not understand. . . . However, not all examples of
this type involve children; if an adult is in a seriously dangerous situation
and is unaware of it, it can also be permissible to intervene paternalistically . ..
Emotionalstress. People sometimes decide to inflict harm on themselves
when they are in periods of great emotional stress. If, for instance, a person
attempts suicide while subject to extreme and unusual stresses, it seems that
another party would be justified in intervening in at least some such cases.
Compulsion and Undue Influence. Self-harming behavior can also be
caused, it seems, by action done under compulsion or undue influence. If
self-harming behavior is due to, say, some irresistible psychological influence, or to threats of greater, other-imposed harm, many would hold that
interference with the behavior could be justified even if the failure to interfere would harm no one other than the person interfered with.
Menial Illness. Closely related to the previous category is that of persons labeled mentally ill or insane. When such persons behave in self-destructive ways, and when this self-destructiveness appears to be part of their
affliction, paternalistic intervention again appears to be justifiable.
Nonrationah'ty. Sometimes persons who are in states of impaired consciousness can be the subjects of apparently justified paternalism. A person
who is, for instance, unconscious due to a blow received in an accident
would be unable to decide for himself whether to do such things as go to a
hospital; in such a case it hardly seems objectionable for someone else to
take the unconscious person to a hospital.
Serious harm. Sometimes the mere fact that a person is about to cause
himself serious harm may be taken as sufficient to justify paternalistic intervention even if the person is not known to fall into any of the above categories. If, for instance, there is no time to ascertain whether the person
threatened with harm has chosen to be in that position, surely it could be
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fore, intervention is sometimes appropriate. The twin safeguards of
presently-existing danger and lack of rational decisionmaking capacity should protect against unwarranted paternalism.
(ii)

Adjudication of capacity for rational decisionmaking

Capacity for rational decisionmaking is a crucial element of the
proposed system. How are the courts to adjudicate this difficult question? At the outset, it is conceded that judges rely heavily on expert
testimony to make this determination. In their recent treatise on psychiatry and the law, Doctors Gutheil and Appelbaum observe that
[a]lthough competency is a legal concept and, under the
law, can only be determined by a judge, the practical realities of clinical care require that clinicians often make their
own assessments of whether a patient is competent or not.
We might call this a determination of "psychological competency" (or "capacity") rather than "legal competency,"
but the impact of these findings are often just as significant
as those emanating from the bench. It is the clinician who
usually decides if a judicial determination of competency is
warranted and, in many cases, it is the clinician's assessment
that serves as the basis, often the sole basis, for the judge's
decision.

30

4

While courts must make the final decision on the issue of capacity, Gutheil and Appelbaum correctly assert that in practice, judges
rely heavily on expert opinion to determine this issue-an issue which
is essentially psychological in nature. To bemoan this reality is unwise, however, because it is precisely in the context of evaluation of
rationality and its effect on decisionmaking capacity that mental
health professionals are at their strongest. 30 5 The training and experience of psychiatrists, psychologists, and clinical social workers renders
them uniquely competent to give reliable expert testimony on such
matters. In the final analysis, it is appropriate to rely on expert
30 6
opinion.
justifiable to interfere with his action at least long enough to determine
whether the person falls into any of the foregoing categories.
Id. at 61-62.
304. T. GUTHEIL& P. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 215 (1982).
305. See TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 6, at 906-19.
306. Seegenerally, L. KOLB & H. BRODIE, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 12734 (1982); TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 6, at 912-19. Contra E. BEIS,
MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW 239-40 (1984).
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In the interest of fairness, however, the law should permit the
proposed patient to select an expert of his or her own choosing. In the
event the individual is poor, as is frequently the case, the state should
bear the cost of the individual's expert.
f.

Police power commitment will continue to be available

The proposal does nothing to displace involuntary commitment
under the police power. Detention would remain available under this
source of state authority. While commitment under the police power
would continue to be an option in severe cases, the proposal should
significantly reduce the need to resort to it.
g.

The problem of enforcement

While community-based involuntary treatment in the least restrictive appropriate setting makes theoretical sense, some will argue
that such a system cannot work in practice. An order for involuntary
treatment is, after all, nothing more than a piece of paper. If the
incapacitated person is living in the community, with freedom to
come and go as he or she pleases, the order may simply be ignored.
Yet, the fact that the proposed system (or any other) will fail in a
percentage of cases is an insufficient reason to give it up entirely. In
most instances, it will provide significant benefit. For some individuals, the fact that a judge has ordered them into treatment may prove
incentive enough to win compliance. In other cases, the order will
provide mental health professionals with a tool they now lack to con30 7
vince reluctant patients to engage in treatment.
If an individual under court order simply refuses to participate
in treatment, professionals may conclude that his or her wishes should
be respected. In such cases, the court could dismiss the order. On the
other hand, mental health professionals may decide that treatment
307. Critics will argue that the "tool" described in the text resembles the stick
more than the carrot. Mental health professionals may use inappropriate threats of
more restrictive treatment to coerce compliance with prescribed therapy. As stated
elsewhere in this article, the potential misuse of the proposed system of involuntary
treatment should not be overemphasized. In most cases, the system will be utilized in
an appropriate manner by professionals genuinely concerned with provision of treatment in the least restrictive alternative. This statement evidences a bias which I
readily admit-I believe that the mental health system and those who work within it
strive for the best possible treatment for those afflicted with serious mental illness.
What is more, I believe that treatment is effective and essential for many individuals.
The time has arrived to build bridges rather than walls between lawyers and mental
health professionals.
These views reflect those expressed by Paul Chodoff, M.D., in a recent article.
See Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitahizalion of the Mentally Ill as a Moral Issue, 141 AM.
PSYCHIATRY

J.

384 (1984).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss2/2

66

Myers: Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Nee
1983-84]

INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT

must be given. In such a case they could petition the court to increase
the restrictiveness of the order to an extent sufficient to obtain compliance. For example, if an individual refuses to take prescribed medication as ordered, the court could increase the restrictiveness of the
order to include a short-term stay in a community residential treatment facility. Many other examples can be constructed. The general
principle should be clear, however. The court would have the authority to review its own orders, and adjust them to meet individual
needs by moving along the proposed continuum of treatment methods. More or less restrictive treatment would be ordered depending
on the facts of the case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The time has arrived for the mental health and legal professions
to work cooperatively toward improving the system by which society
affords involuntary psychiatric treatment to the seriously mentally ill.
The present involuntary commitment system is unresponsive to patient needs because it ignores the broad array of community-based
treatment modalities that are available. To be more responsive to the
needs of patients, the system should be expanded to include the complete continuum of treatment modalities. Furthermore, greatly enhanced efforts must be made to expand and adequately fund
community-based treatment alternatives. Under the proposed system, the individual treatment needs of each patient will be met by
affording effective treatment with the least possible restriction of personal liberty and autonomy.
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